Onderwerp: Cisco Clean Access Agent (Perfigo) bypass

Description:
Cisco Clean Access is an easily deployed software solution that can automatically detect, isolate, and clean infected or vulnerable devices that attempt to access your network. It identifies whether networked devices such as laptops, personal digital assi
stants, even game consoles are compliant with your network's security policies and repairs any vulnerabilities before permitting access to the network.

Vendor site:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6128/

Affected versions:
This works in at least 3.5.3.1 and 3.5.4.

Discovery Date:
2005-08-12

Report Date:
2005-08-19

Severity:
Medium

Vulnerability:
End users can bypass the "mandatory" installation of the Clean Access Agent by changing the User-Agent string of their browser. This allows them to connect to the network without the host-based checks being run. If configured, remote checks are still run.

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This is in response to the email posted by 'llhansen-bugtraq@adams.edu'=20
on August 19, 2005.=20

The original email is available at
http://www.securityfocus.com/archive.../30/0/threaded .

Attached: a cleartext, PGP signed version of this same email.

Hi llhansen,
While it is correct that a user can modify the 'User-Agent' string
on access to the CCA Server authentication page in order to prevent
installation of the CCA Agent, there are some things that should be
clarified:

1) Users cannot bypass authentication irrespective of the value of
the 'User-Agent' string provided. Hence, there is no danger of=20
invalid users (users with no credentials or invalid credentials)=20
getting onto the network.=20

2) If there is the suspicion that a malicious user might try to=20
masquerade as non-Windows machines, e.g. Linux, in order to bypass=20
CCA Agent installation, the administrator can define Network Scanning=20
rules on the CCA Manager and use Nessus scans to determine the real=20
OS in use. This will catch users that are masquerading. For this, the=20
CCA administrator can either obtain the appropiate plug-ins from=20
Tenable or www.nessus.org - as an alternative, users can write and=20
integrate their own plugins.

3) Furthermore, if the malicious user installs a personal firewall or
similar software, in order to make the network scan timeout, CCA=20
provides options to quarantine the malicious user if the network scan
times out. Hence, such users can also get quarantined, following which=20
administrators can determine whether the user is masquerading or not.=20

CCA continues to evolve and include safeguards to prevent malicious=20
users from trying to bypass the checks in place.

Thank you for your work on this problem. As always, working with the
Cisco PSIRT team is the best way to verify the accuracy of information=20
before posting it publicly.

We do greatly appreciate the opportunity to work with researchers on=20
security vulnerabilities, and welcome the opportunity to review and
assist with Product Security Advisories. Our ultimate goal is to ensure

that customers have accurate information on which to base upgrade and
workaround decisions and we welcome partnership with researchers=20
towards that goal.

Thanks,
Dario

Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum viditur

Dario Ciccarone
CCIE #10395=20
Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT)
Cisco Systems, Inc.
dciccaro@cisco.com
=20

> -----Original Message-----
> From: llhansen-bugtraq@adams.edu [mailto:llhansen-bugtraq@adams.edu]=20
> Sent: Friday, August 19, 2005 12:30 PM
> To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
> Subject: Cisco Clean Access Agent (Perfigo) bypass
>=20
> Description:=20
> Cisco Clean Access is an easily deployed software solution=20
> that can automatically detect, isolate, and clean infected or=20
> vulnerable devices that attempt to access your network. It=20
> identifies whether networked devices such as laptops,=20
> personal digital assistants, even game consoles are compliant=20
> with your network's security policies and repairs any=20
> vulnerabilities before permitting access to the network.=20
>=20
> Vendor site:
> http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6128/
>=20
> Affected versions:=20
> This works in at least 3.5.3.1 and 3.5.4.
>=20
> Discovery Date:=20
> 2005-08-12
>=20
> Report Date:=20
> 2005-08-19
>=20
> Severity:
> Medium
>=20
> Vulnerability:=20
> End users can bypass the "mandatory" installation of the=20
> Clean Access Agent by changing the User-Agent string of their=20
> browser. This allows them to connect to the network without=20
> the host-based checks being run. If configured, remote checks=20
> are still run.
>=20
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This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

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=20
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
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Hi there,

This post is to confirm that the Cisco Systems PSIRT is actively
researching into this issue. We will be providing a more thorough answer
on Monday, August 22, 2005.

Attached: a cleartext, PGP signed version of this same email.

Thanks,
Dario

Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum viditur

Dario Ciccarone
CCIE #10395=20
Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT)
Cisco Systems, Inc.
dciccaro@cisco.com
=20

> -----Original Message-----
> From: llhansen-bugtraq@adams.edu [mailto:llhansen-bugtraq@adams.edu]=20
> Sent: Friday, August 19, 2005 12:30 PM
> To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
> Subject: Cisco Clean Access Agent (Perfigo) bypass
>=20
> Description:=20
> Cisco Clean Access is an easily deployed software solution=20
> that can automatically detect, isolate, and clean infected or=20
> vulnerable devices that attempt to access your network. It=20
> identifies whether networked devices such as laptops,=20
> personal digital assistants, even game consoles are compliant=20
> with your network's security policies and repairs any=20
> vulnerabilities before permitting access to the network.=20
>=20
> Vendor site:
> http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6128/
>=20
> Affected versions:=20
> This works in at least 3.5.3.1 and 3.5.4.
>=20
> Discovery Date:=20
> 2005-08-12
>=20
> Report Date:=20
> 2005-08-19
>=20
> Severity:
> Medium
>=20
> Vulnerability:=20
> End users can bypass the "mandatory" installation of the=20
> Clean Access Agent by changing the User-Agent string of their=20
> browser. This allows them to connect to the network without=20
> the host-based checks being run. If configured, remote checks=20
> are still run.
>=20
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More clarification, response to Cisco guy,

1) Authenticated windows users can get on the network without installing the CCA agent, unless, "the administrator can define Network Scanning
rules on the CCA Manager and use Nessus scans to determine the real OS in use". Perhaps remote checks should be required and user-agent not an option.

3) Suggestion was made that machines with a firewall secure enough that CCA-perfigo can't scan them be quarantined. Interesting paradox.

More interesting CCA usage problems:
Non malicious users may change their user-agent string to access banking sites etc..

Worms may start changing user-agent strings to muck with CCA like systems.

I wonder how secure the agent itself is.

The CCA OS probably needs some updates:
Redhat 7.3
kernel 2.4.9-perfigo (source code is where?)
openssh-server-3.1p1-14
zlib-1.1.3-24

You can be aided by using a firefox plugin called 'user agent switcher'. http://chrispederick.com/work/useragentswitcher/

You can find more user agents by searching google for them. They are have the extension of .xml