Likes Likes:  0
Resultaten 1 tot 4 van de 4
Geen
  1. #1
    Joseph Barillari
    Capital One's website inadvertently assists phishing
    Gast
    n/a Berichten
    Berichten zijn liked



    Thread Starter

    Capital One's website inadvertently assists phishing

    Capital One's website has an unchecked redirect. I'm used to seeing
    these exploited by slashdot trolls (e.g., sending people to the goatse
    picture when they think they're going to microsoft.com), but this is
    the first case in which I've seen one at a bank's website.

    I emailed the Capital One people twice about it, but received only
    form-letter responses: one telling me that it was a phishing scam, the
    other telling me that a response would be forthcoming in 72 hours
    (this is when I mentioned bugtraq, which I suspect sets off a
    keyword-based response). It's now four business days later, so I'm
    assuming that a response is not forthcoming. I thought the bugtraq
    crowd might be interested -- it would be nice if the security people
    at the banks and credit card companies on this list could rework the
    redirect scripts on their websites to only redirect to trusted
    URLs. (Incidentally, as of this emailing, the original phisher appears
    to have been shut down, but the redirect is still unchecked.)

    Try it:
    http://www.capitalone.com/redirect.h.../wiki/Phishing

    Permalink: http://barillari.org/blog/computers/...ephishing.html


    best,


    --Joe





    ----- Forwarded message from Joseph Barillari <redacted> -----

    Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2005 16:29:45 -0400
    From: Joseph Barillari <redacted>
    To: webinfo@capitalone.com
    Subject: Re: Capital One website inadvertently assists phishing

    Also -- in the interests of protecting people from this bug, I'm going
    to forward this message to the bugtraq mailing list at 4:30pm EST
    tomorrow. best, --Joe

    On Wed, Apr 13, 2005 at 01:54:51AM -0400, Joseph Barillari wrote:
    > Hi. I received this phishing message earlier. Unusually, Capital One
    > is _helping_ the phishers: they're taking advantage of an unchecked
    > redirect script. When a user clicks on the link below, they get
    > redirected _by_ Capital One to the phisher's site. I'd recommend that
    > you change that redirect script so it starts checking the destination
    > link immediately, and shut down the phisher.
    >
    > best,
    >
    > --Joe
    >
    > ----- Forwarded message from "Capital One Representative: Kristina Barker " <Kristina.Barker@capitalone.com> -----
    >
    > From: "Capital One Representative: Kristina Barker " <Kristina.Barker@capitalone.com>
    > To: redacted
    > Subject: Error: Your Capital One Account Tue, 12 Apr 2005 22:25:00 -0800
    > Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2005 03:25:00 -0300
    > X-Spam-Flag: YES
    > X-Spam-Level: *****
    > X-Spam-Status: Yes, score=5.9 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_60,NORMAL_HTTP_TO_IP,
    > RCVD_HELO_IP_MISMATCH,RCVD_IN_NJABL_DUL,RCVD_IN_SO RBS_DUL,
    > RCVD_NUMERIC_HELO,URI_REDIRECTOR autolearn=no version=3.0.2
    >
    > Spam detection software, running on the system "bigbox.barillari.org", has
    > identified this incoming email as possible spam. The original message
    > has been attached to this so you can view it (if it isn't spam) or label
    > similar future email. If you have any questions, see
    > the administrator of that system for details.
    >
    > Content preview: Capital One is committed to maintaining a safe
    > environment for its community of buyers and sellers. To protect the
    > security of your account, Capital One Bank employs some of the most
    > advanced security systems in the world and our anti-fraud teams
    > regularly screen the Capital One Bank system for unusual activity.
    > [...]
    >
    > Content analysis details: (5.9 points, 3.0 required)
    >
    > pts rule name description
    > ---- ---------------------- --------------------------------------------------
    > 0.0 URI_REDIRECTOR Message has HTTP redirector URI
    > 2.2 RCVD_HELO_IP_MISMATCH Received: HELO and IP do not match, but should
    > 1.2 RCVD_NUMERIC_HELO Received: contains an IP address used for HELO
    > 0.0 NORMAL_HTTP_TO_IP URI: Uses a dotted-decimal IP address in URL
    > 0.4 BAYES_60 BODY: Bayesian spam probability is 60 to 80%
    > [score: 0.7218]
    > 2.0 RCVD_IN_SORBS_DUL RBL: SORBS: sent directly from dynamic IP address
    > [204.210.183.22 listed in dnsbl.sorbs.net]
    > 0.1 RCVD_IN_NJABL_DUL RBL: NJABL: dialup sender did non-local SMTP
    > [204.210.183.22 listed in combined.njabl.org]
    >
    >
    >
    > Content-Description: original message before SpamAssassin
    > Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2005 03:25:00 -0300
    > From: "Capital One Representative: Kristina Barker " <Kristina.Barker@capitalone.com>
    > To: 2bslashdot@barillari.org
    > Subject: Error: Your Capital One Account Tue, 12 Apr 2005 22:25:00 -0800
    > X-Spam-Score: 10.407
    > X-Spam-Flag: YES
    > X-Spam-Level: ********** (10.407)
    >
    > Capital One is committed to maintaining a safe environment for its
    > community of buyers and sellers. To protect the security of your account,
    > Capital One Bank employs some of the most advanced security systems in the world
    > and our anti-fraud teams regularly screen the Capital One Bank system for
    > unusual activity.
    >
    > We recently have determined that different computers have logged onto your
    > Capital One Banking account, and multiple password failures were present before the
    > logons. We now need you to re-confirm your account information to us. If this is
    > not completed by April 14, 2006, we will be forced to suspend your account
    > indefinitely, as it may have been used for fraudulent purposes. We thank you for
    > your cooperation in this manner.
    >
    > In order to confirm your Online Bank records, we may require some specific
    > information from you.
    >
    >
    > Click below to verify your account
    >
    > http://www.capitalone.com/redirect.h...apitalone.com/
    >
    >
    > Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter. Please understand that this is
    > a security measure meant to help protect you and your account.
    >
    > We apologize for any inconvenience.
    >
    > If you choose to ignore our request, you leave us no choice but to temporaly suspend
    > your account.
    >
    > Thank you for using Capital One Bank!
    >
    >
    >
    >
    > ----- End forwarded message -----


    ----- End forwarded message -----

  2. #2
    Joseph Barillari
    Capital One's website inadvertently assists phishing
    Gast
    n/a Berichten
    Berichten zijn liked



    Thread Starter

    Re: Capital One's website inadvertently assists phishing

    On Tue, Apr 19, 2005 at 05:30:28PM -0500, dramatools wrote:
    > However, I clicked your "proof of concept" link and found that the
    > redirector did not send me to Wikipedia as expected, but Capital One's
    > home page. Perhaps one of their security people is lurking on bugtraq
    > and attempted to fix the problem on the spot. I'll keep monitoring this
    > one.


    Looks like full disclosure worked. Thanks!

    http://barillari.org/blog/computers/...g-updated.html

    Timeline (should be mostly complete):

    |13 Apr 01:28:45 -0400|Phishing email exploiting unchecked redirect arrives|
    |13 Apr 01:54:51 -0400|Emailed webinfo@capitalone.com to report it|
    |13 Apr 01:53:00 -0400|Blog post "posted":http://barillari.org/blog/computers/...ephishing.html|
    |13 Apr 16:29:45 -0400|Inform Capital One of my intention to post to "bugtraq":http://securityfocus.org/archive/1 in 24 hours|
    |13 Apr 16:31:11 -0400|Capital One form letter arrives: "this [phishing] email has not compromised Capital One's systems in any way,"|
    |13 Apr 16:44:42 -0400|Reply to Capital One form letter: "this email _has_ taken advantage of a compromised Capital One system: Capital One's website redirects URLs without checking them....please see the note about bugtraq below"|
    |13 Apr 16:47:15 -0400|Another form letter: "A Capital One representative will respond to your e-mail inquiry, usually within 24 - 48 hours. Please note, due to high email volumes, this timeframe may be extended to up to 72 hours". I wonder if saying "bug
    traq" provokes this response.|
    |19 Apr 16:32:15 -0400|Four business days later (well beyond 72h), redirect is still unchecked. "Post":http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/396255 bug to bugtraq and cc Capital One|
    |19 Apr 16:53:46 -0400|Reply to Capital One (signed by a human?) form letter: "the point is that the phishing email _has_ exploited a flaw in Capital One's systems. Your website permits unchecked redirects. This makes a phisher's job much, much easier.|

    |19 Apr 18:01:00 -0400|A bugtraq subscriber tells me that he's emailed abuse@capitalone.com (I should have thought of that)|
    |19 Apr 14:27:05 -0800|<b>Another bugtraq subscriber tells me that it's fixed.</b> Checked myself --- apparently, it is.|
    |19 Apr 18:55:38 -0400|Send email to webinfo@, thanking them for fixing the unchecked redirect.|


  3. #3
    Allen Parker
    Capital One's website inadvertently assists phishing
    Gast
    n/a Berichten
    Berichten zijn liked



    Thread Starter

    Re: Capital One's website inadvertently assists phishing

    Just tested, seems fixed.

    On 4/19/05, Joseph Barillari <bugtraq@barillari.org> wrote:
    > Capital One's website has an unchecked redirect. I'm used to seeing
    > these exploited by slashdot trolls (e.g., sending people to the goatse
    > picture when they think they're going to microsoft.com), but this is
    > the first case in which I've seen one at a bank's website.

    <snip>

    --=20
    ________________________________________
    To avoid being added to my spam filter:
    1. Utilize list replies unless otherwise requested.
    2. If you DO send me a personal email, use english.
    3. HTML isn't cute. It belongs on the web, not in my inbox.

  4. #4
    Rager, Anton
    Capital One's website inadvertently assists phishing
    Gast
    n/a Berichten
    Berichten zijn liked



    Thread Starter

    RE: Capital One's website inadvertently assists phishing

    This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

    ------_=_NextPart_001_01C54B70.2B5EBE1C
    Content-Type: text/plain;
    charset="us-ascii"
    Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

    This an interesting 'fix'.

    It appears that the redirector domain check logic is in the '200 OK'
    response from capitalone's server in the form of HTML/Javascript. The
    client logic checks the redirect location against a list of valid sites
    or a regex match on "capitalone.com" domain. There are several ways to
    circumvent this javascript logic:

    1 - The check for "capitalone.com" is a simple regex check within the
    URL string, so if the attacker can create a valid domain named
    "capitalone.com.attacker.com", then it will pass the validation checks
    and redirect to the attacker's server.

    http://www.capitalone.com/redirect.h...LIDATION&dest=
    =3D
    http://capitalone.com.attacker.com

    The regex for /capitalone.com/ matches within the URL and allows the
    rest of the URL to pass thru.

    2 - The check is not actually aware of all the ways URLs can be
    formatted, and user@domain can be used to fool the checks. An example
    would be "http://www.capitalone.com@attacker.com" for the redirect URL.
    This will throw a warning in Firefox and doesn't work with IE, but is a
    way around the filter.

    http://www.capitalone.com/redirect.h...LIDATION&dest=
    =3D
    http://www.capitalone.com@attacker.com

    The substring/regex matches on the initial occurrence of
    http://capitalone.com, but when the browser decodes the URL it submits a
    userID of "http://capitalone.com" to the site "attacker.com".

    3 - if an attacker specifies a redirect location early in the URL
    without using a :// ref, the :// ref con be placed later in the string
    to trick the check logic.

    http://www.capitalone.com/redirect.h...LIDATION&dest=
    =3D
    //www.attacker.com/http://www.capitalone.com

    The substring/regex logic is looking for what follows after the "://"
    sequence, so doesn't pay attention to the first portion that actually is
    the URL the browser goes to. We have to add the "//" after "dest=3D" to
    force the browser to treat the location as another site.

    4 - The above idea should also apply to javascript tags, but the server
    CGI seems to be forwarding to capitalone.com when there is a match for
    the string "script" anywhere in the URL. Odd way to block XSS.....I
    wonder why that server-side logic isn't doing the valid site checks as
    well?

    This means that "javascript:", "livescript", "ecmascript", "jscript:"
    and "vbscript:" are blocked, but "mocha:" gets thru if you have a
    browser that actually understands that ref like older Netscape (test in
    4.7x and it works)

    http://www.capitalone.com/redirect.h...LIDATION&dest=
    =3D
    mocha:alert(document.domain)//http://www.capitalone.com


    I've attached the client-side Javascript validation document for
    reference. It's also somewhat interesting what other sites they will
    allow redirection to.

    These checks really need to analyze URLs more fully and should be done
    server-side instead of using client javascript to allow/block redirects.


    Regards,

    Anton Rager
    arager@avaya.com

    -----Original Message-----
    From: Joseph Barillari [mailto:bugtraq@barillari.org]=20
    Sent: Tuesday, April 19, 2005 5:12 PM
    To: dramatools
    Cc: bugtraq@securityfocus.com; webinfo@capitalone.com
    Subject: Re: Capital One's website inadvertently assists phishing

    On Tue, Apr 19, 2005 at 05:30:28PM -0500, dramatools wrote:
    > However, I clicked your "proof of concept" link and found that the
    > redirector did not send me to Wikipedia as expected, but Capital One's
    > home page. Perhaps one of their security people is lurking on bugtraq
    > and attempted to fix the problem on the spot. I'll keep monitoring

    this
    > one.


    Looks like full disclosure worked. Thanks!

    http://barillari.org/blog/computers/...pdated.html=20

    Timeline (should be mostly complete):

    |13 Apr 01:28:45 -0400|Phishing email exploiting unchecked redirect
    arrives|
    |13 Apr 01:54:51 -0400|Emailed webinfo@capitalone.com to report it|
    |13 Apr 01:53:00 -0400|Blog post
    "posted":http://barillari.org/blog/computers/...ephishing.html|
    |13 Apr 16:29:45 -0400|Inform Capital One of my intention to post to
    "bugtraq":http://securityfocus.org/archive/1 in 24 hours|
    |13 Apr 16:31:11 -0400|Capital One form letter arrives: "this
    [phishing] email has not compromised Capital One's systems in any way,"|
    |13 Apr 16:44:42 -0400|Reply to Capital One form letter: "this email
    _has_ taken advantage of a compromised Capital One system: Capital One's
    website redirects URLs without checking them....please see the note
    about bugtraq below"|
    |13 Apr 16:47:15 -0400|Another form letter: "A Capital One
    representative will respond to your e-mail inquiry, usually within 24 -
    48 hours. Please note, due to high email volumes, this timeframe may be
    extended to up to 72 hours". I wonder if saying "bugtraq" provokes this
    response.|
    |19 Apr 16:32:15 -0400|Four business days later (well beyond 72h),
    redirect is still unchecked.
    "Post":http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/396255 bug to bugtraq and
    cc Capital One|
    |19 Apr 16:53:46 -0400|Reply to Capital One (signed by a human?) form
    letter: "the point is that the phishing email _has_ exploited a flaw in
    Capital One's systems. Your website permits unchecked redirects. This
    makes a phisher's job much, much easier.|
    |19 Apr 18:01:00 -0400|A bugtraq subscriber tells me that he's emailed
    abuse@capitalone.com (I should have thought of that)|
    |19 Apr 14:27:05 -0800|<b>Another bugtraq subscriber tells me that it's
    fixed.</b> Checked myself --- apparently, it is.|
    |19 Apr 18:55:38 -0400|Send email to webinfo@, thanking them for fixing
    the unchecked redirect.|





    ------_=_NextPart_001_01C54B70.2B5EBE1C
    Content-Type: text/plain;
    name="capitalone_com-redirect_page.txt"
    Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
    Content-Description: capitalone_com-redirect_page.txt
    Content-Disposition: attachment;
    filename="capitalone_com-redirect_page.txt"

    PEhUTUw+IA0KPEhFQUQ+IA0KPHRpdGxlPlJlZGlyZWN0aW5nLi 4uLjwvdGl0bGU+IA0KPE1FVEEg
    aHR0cC1lcXVpdj0iY2FjaGUtY29udHJvbCIgY29udGVudD0ibm 8tY2FjaGUiPiANCjxNRVRBIGh0
    dHAtZXF1aXY9InByYWdtYSIgY29udGVudD0ibm8tY2FjaGUiPi ANCjxNRVRBIGh0dHAtZXF1aXY9
    ImV4cGlyZXMiIGNvbnRlbnQ9IldlZCwgMjYgRmViIDE5OTcgMD g6MjE6NTcgR01UIj4gDQo8U0NS
    SVBUIExBTkdVQUdFPSJKYXZhU2NyaXB0Ij4gDQp2YXIgdXJsX3 N0ciA9IHRvcC5sb2NhdGlvbi5o
    cmVmOyANCnZhciB1cmxfaW5kZXggPSB1cmxfc3RyLmluZGV4T2 YoImRlc3Q9Iik7IA0KLy9mb3Ig
    aWRlbnRpZnlpbmcgdXJscyBjb250YWluZyAiZ2V0bXljYXJkIi BhbmQgImFwcGx5MiIgDQp2YXIg
    ZW50cnlVUkwgPSB3aW5kb3cubG9jYXRpb24uc2VhcmNoLnRvTG 93ZXJDYXNlKCk7IA0KdmFyIHRy
    dXN0ZWROYW1lcyA9ICJ3d3cudHVjLmNhfHd3dy5lcXVpZmF4Lm NhfHd3dy5jb25zdW1lci1hY3Rp
    b24ub3JnfHd3dy55b3VyY3JlZGl0Y2FyZGNvbXBhbmllcy5jb2 18cGh4LmNvcnBvcmF0ZS1pci5u
    ZXR8IjsNCnRydXN0ZWROYW1lcyArPSAid3d3LmNiLm5ldHx3d3 cuc2Vjb25kaGFydmVzdC5vcmd8
    d3d3LmhlYXJ0b2ZhbWVyaWNhLm9yZ3x3d3cuanVtcHN0YXJ0Y2 9hbGl0aW9uLm9yZ3x3d3cud2hp
    dGVob3VzZWRydWdwb2xpY3kuZ292fCI7DQp0cnVzdGVkTmFtZX MgKz0gInd3dy50aGVhbnRpZHJ1
    Zy5vcmd8d3d3LmNvdmVyaW5na2lkcy5vcmd8d3d3Lm5hdGlvbm FsLnVuaXRlZHdheS5vcmd8d3d3
    LmNhcGl0YWxvbmVtb3J0Z2FnZS5jb218d3d3LmZ1bGxzcGVjdH J1bWxlbmRpbmcuY29tfCI7DQp0
    cnVzdGVkTmFtZXMgKz0gInBhcnRuZXJzLmZpbmFuY2VudGVyLm NvbXx3d3cucGVvcGxlZmlyc3Qu
    Y29tfHd3dy5yZWxpYXF1b3RlLmNvbXx3d3cuY2FwaXRhbG9uZW F1dG9maW5hbmNlLmNvbXxjYXBp
    dGFsb25lY2FyZWVyc29uZS5jb218IjsNCnRydXN0ZWROYW1lcy ArPSAid3d3LmhybWMtYzEuY29t
    fHd3dy5saW5rYWdlaW5jLmNvbXx3d3cubmJtYmFhLm9yZ3x3d3 cubnNiZS5vcmd8d3d3Lm5zaG1i
    YS5vcmd8IjsNCnRydXN0ZWROYW1lcyArPSAid3d3LnJlYWNoaW 5nb3V0bWJhLm9yZ3x1c2Eudmlz
    YS5jb218d3d3Lm1hc3RlcmNhcmQuY29tfHd3dy5jYXJwYXJ0cy 5jb218d3d3LnBsYW5wbHVzLWRp
    c2NvdW50cy5jb218IjsNCnRydXN0ZWROYW1lcyArPSAid3d3Lm 1pbGVzb25lLmNvbXx3d3cuYWRv
    YmUuY29tfHd3dy5lcXVpZmF4LmNvbXx3d3cuZXhwZXJpYW4uY2 9tfHd3dy50cmFuc3VuaW9uLmNv
    bXwiOw0KdHJ1c3RlZE5hbWVzICs9ICJ3d3cudXNhLnZpc2EuY2 9tfHd3dy5jb25zdW1lci5nb3Z8
    d3d3LmZ0Yy5nb3Z8d3d3LnNlY3VyZXN1aXRlLm5ldHx3d3cub2 NjYy5zdGF0ZS50eC51c3wiOw0K
    dHJ1c3RlZE5hbWVzICs9ICJ3d3cubW9uZXktd2lzZS5vcmd8d3 d3Lm1vbmV5d2lzZS11LmNvbXx3
    d3cueW91bmdtb25leS5jb218d3d3Lm1pbGVzb25lLmNvbXx3d3 cubXljYXBpdGFsb25lcmV3YXJk
    cy5jb218IjsNCnRydXN0ZWROYW1lcyArPSAid3d3LmNvbGxlZ2 VvbmVjYXJkLmNvbXx3d3cuY2Fw
    aXRhbG9uZXNhdmluZ3MuY29tfGNpYi5pYmFua2luZy1zZXJ2aW Nlcy5jb218bXkuY2FwaXRhbG9u
    ZWF1dG9maW5hbmNlLmNvbXxjYXBpdGFsb25lLm1vcnRnYWdlZX NlcnZpY2VzLmNvbXwiOw0KdHJ1
    c3RlZE5hbWVzICs9ICJ3d3cuY2FwaXRhbG9uZS5pbnNsb2dpYy 5jb218d3d3LmNhcGl0YWxvbmVp
    c2xhbmQuY29tfHd3dy5nZXRteWNhcmQuY29tfHd3dy5jYXBpdG Fsb25laG9tZWVxdWl0eS5jb218
    d3d3LmNhcGl0YWxvbmVoZWFsdGhjYXJlZmluYW5jZS5jb218Ij sNCnRydXN0ZWROYW1lcyArPSAi
    c2VjdXJlLmNhcGl0YWxvbmVmaW5hbmNlLmNvbXx3d3cuamFtc2 Fkci5jb218d3d3LmFkci5vcmd8
    d3d3LmFyYml0cmF0aW9uLWZvcnVtLmNvbXx3d3cuY2FwaXRhbG 9uZS5jYXwiOw0KdHJ1c3RlZE5h
    bWVzICs9ICJ3d3cuY2FwaXRhbG9uZS5jby51a3x3d3cuY2FwaX RhbG9uZS5pdHx3d3cyLmlyYXNl
    cnZpY2VjZW50ZXIuY29tfHd3dy5jb218d3d3LnByb2dyZXNzaX ZlLmNvbXwiOw0KdHJ1c3RlZE5h
    bWVzICs9ICJ3d3cuQ2FwaXRhbE9uZUF1dG9JbnN1cmFuY2UuY2 9tfHd3dy5mZGljLmdvdnxjYXBp
    dGFsb25lLmluc2xvZ2ljLmNvbXx3d3cuY2l0aXplbnNoZWFsdG guY29tfHd3dy5lYWRpbnN1cmFu
    Y2UuY29tfCI7DQp0cnVzdGVkTmFtZXMgKz0gInd3dy5SZW50ZX JzSW5zLmNvbXx3d3cuaW5zdXJl
    a2lkc25vdy5nb3Z8Y2FwaXRhbG9uZS5tb3J0Z2FnZWVzZXJ2aW Nlcy5jb218d3d3LmJiYi5vcmd8
    d3d3LnNiYS5nb3YiOw0KaWYgKHVybF9pbmRleCAhPSAtMSkgey ANCgl2YXIgZG9tYWluX3N0YXJ0
    ID0gdXJsX2luZGV4ICsgNTsgDQoJdmFyIHVybF92YWx1ZSA9IH VybF9zdHIuc3Vic3RyaW5nKGRv
    bWFpbl9zdGFydCwgdXJsX3N0ci5sZW5ndGgpOyANCgkNCgl2YX Igc2VydmVySW5kZXggPSB1cmxf
    dmFsdWUuaW5kZXhPZigiOi8vIik7DQoJaWYgKHNlcnZlckluZG V4ID09IC0xKQ0KCQlsb2NhdGlv
    bi5yZXBsYWNlKCJodHRwOi8vd3d3LmNhcGl0YWxvbmUuY29tIi k7DQoJDQoJdmFyIHNlcnZlck5h
    bWUgPSB1cmxfdmFsdWUuc3Vic3RyKHNlcnZlckluZGV4ICsgMy kudG9Mb3dlckNhc2UoKTsNCglp
    ZiAoc2VydmVyTmFtZS5pbmRleE9mKCIvIikgIT0gLTEpDQoJCX NlcnZlck5hbWUgPSBzZXJ2ZXJO
    YW1lLnN1YnN0cigwLCBzZXJ2ZXJOYW1lLmluZGV4T2YoIi8iKS k7DQoJDQoJaWYgKChzZXJ2ZXJO
    YW1lLnNlYXJjaCgvY2FwaXRhbG9uZS5jb20vZ2kpICE9IC0xKS B8fCAodHJ1c3RlZE5hbWVzLnRv
    TG93ZXJDYXNlKCkuaW5kZXhPZihzZXJ2ZXJOYW1lKSAhPSAtMS kpIHsNCgkJaWYgKChlbnRyeVVS
    TC5zZWFyY2goImdldG15Y2FyZCIpICE9IC0xKSB8fCAoZW50cn lVUkwuc2VhcmNoKCJhcHBseTIi
    KSAhPSAtMSkpIHsgDQoJCQl2YXIgcmVmZXJyaW5nVVJMID0gZG 9jdW1lbnQucmVmZXJyZXI7IA0K
    CQkJaWYocmVmZXJyaW5nVVJMICE9ICIiKSB7DQoJCQkJbG9jYX Rpb24ucmVwbGFjZSh1cmxfdmFs
    dWUrJyZyZWZlcnJlclVSTD0nK3JlZmVycmluZ1VSTCk7IA0KCQ kJfSBlbHNlIHsgDQoJCQkJLy8g
    cmVmZXJyaW5nVVJMIGlzIE5VTEwNCgkJCQlpZiAod2luZG93Lm 9wZW5lciE9dW5kZWZpbmVkKSB7
    IA0KCQkJCQl2YXIgcG9wcmVmVVJMID0gd2luZG93Lm9wZW5lci 5sb2NhdGlvbi5ocmVmOyANCgkJ
    CQkJbG9jYXRpb24ucmVwbGFjZSh1cmxfdmFsdWUrJyZyZWZlcn JlclVSTD0nK3BvcHJlZlVSTCk7
    IA0KCQkJCX0gZWxzZSB7IA0KICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAgICAgICAJbG9jYXRp
    b24ucmVwbGFjZSh1cmxfdmFsdWUpOyANCgkJCQl9IA0KCQkJfS ANCgkJfSBlbHNlIHsgDQoJCQls
    b2NhdGlvbi5yZXBsYWNlKHVybF92YWx1ZSk7IA0KCQl9IA0KCX 0gZWxzZSB7DQoJCWxvY2F0aW9u
    LnJlcGxhY2UoImh0dHA6Ly93d3cuY2FwaXRhbG9uZS5jb20iKT sNCgl9DQp9DQo8L1NDUklQVD4g
    DQo8L0hFQUQ+PG5vc2NyaXB0PjxwPllvdSBkbyBub3QgaGF2ZS BKYXZhU2NyaXB0IGVuYWJsZWQu
    IFBsZWFzZSByZS1lbmFibGUgSmF2YVNjcmlwdCBhbmQgdHJ5IG FnYWluLiA8L3A+IA0KPHA+PGEg
    aHJlZj0iLyI+Q29udGludWU8L2E+PC9wPiANCjwvbm9zY3JpcH Q+IA0KDQo8L0hUTUw+DQo=

    ------_=_NextPart_001_01C54B70.2B5EBE1C--

Webhostingtalk.nl

Contact

  • Rokin 113-115
  • 1012 KP, Amsterdam
  • Nederland
  • Contact
© Copyright 2001-2026 Webhostingtalk.nl.
Web Statistics