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  1. #1
    Secure Science Corporation Advisory Notice
    SSC Advisory TSA-051 (T-mobile wireless and Verizon Northwest)
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    SSC Advisory TSA-051 (T-mobile wireless and Verizon Northwest)

    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
    Hash: SHA1

    Secure Science Corporation Advisory TSA-051
    http://www.securescience.net
    e-response@securescience.net
    877-570-0455

    - ---------------------------------------------------------

    T-mobile Wireless and Verizon Northwest are vulnerable to caller-ID
    authentication spoofing, enabling arbitrary compromise of customer
    voicemail/message center.

    - ---------------------------------------------------------------------

    Vulnerability Classification: Authentication bypass, remote compromise,
    confidential information breach.

    Discovery Date: July 09, 2004
    Vendor Contacted: July 28, 2004
    Advisory publication date: August 11, 2004


    Abstract:
    - ---------
    T-mobile Wireless and Verizon Northwest (Washington state) grant
    implicit trust to certain Caller-ID input for receiving voicemails and
    accessing customer message preferences. Caller-ID spoofing allows
    forgery of a calling number to the target number. When spoofing the
    target number while calling T-mobile or Verizon Northwest, the target
    trusts the CID to be accurate, bypassing the password response, and
    allows direct access into the targets voicemail message center.

    Description:
    - ------------
    During a recent demo with Caller-ID spoofing, a discovery was made when
    spoofing the targets own number. When calling the target, and if they
    did not pick up the call, the voice mail box would go into administrator
    mode without verifying or authenticating a voice mail box passcode.
    This confidential information breach is caused by the implicit trust of
    Caller-ID as the sole authentication mechanism from the targets phone.

    Particularly T-mobile is of greater concern, as it demonstrates when
    dealing with the threat model of a lost or stolen phone, an arbitrary
    entity can listen to the voicemail without authentication from the lost
    or stolen phone. Most mobile carriers do trust the Caller-ID that is
    displayed, but still ask for a passcode.

    Verizon Northwest (formerly GTE) has the same vulnerability, excepting
    that it is a landline carrier, not a mobile service.


    Tested Vendors:
    - ---------------
    T-Mobile Wireless
    Verizon Northwest

    Suspected Vendors:
    - ------------------
    Multiple untested Telco vendors
    Multiple Credit-Card activation protocols

    Vendor and Patch Information:
    - -----------------------------
    Secure Science Corporation has made multiple attempts to contact the
    vendors with no response.

    Solution:
    - ---------
    Add 2-factor authentication (passcode requirement) by default and cease
    implicit trust of Caller-ID information.

    Credits:
    - --------
    Secure Science Corporation: Lance James, with many thanks to Samy Kamkar
    and Dachb0den Labs.

    Disclaimer:
    - -----------
    Secure Science Corporation is not responsible for the misuse of any of
    the information we provide on this website and/or through our security
    advisories. Our advisories are a service to our customers intended to
    promote secure installation and use of Secure Science Corporation products.
    - --
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    Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://enigmail.mozdev.org

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  2. #2
    Joe Eversole
    SSC Advisory TSA-051 (T-mobile wireless and Verizon Northwest)
    Gast
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    Thread Starter

    Re: SSC Advisory TSA-051 (T-mobile wireless and Verizon Northwest)

    On Wed, 11 Aug 2004 14:10:18 -0700, Secure Science Corporation
    Advisory Notice <bugtraq@securescience.net> wrote:

    > Solution:
    > - ---------
    > Add 2-factor authentication (passcode requirement) by default and cease
    > implicit trust of Caller-ID information.


    T-Mobile's messaging system (in Indianapolis, at least. I do not know
    if they have migrated to a single VM system) has a setting the user
    can specify to require passcode when calling from mobile phone.

    --je

  3. #3
    Brad Herbert
    SSC Advisory TSA-051 (T-mobile wireless and Verizon Northwest)
    Gast
    n/a Berichten
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    Thread Starter

    Re: SSC Advisory TSA-051 (T-mobile wireless and Verizon Northwest)

    Actually, you should know that these systems authenticate based on Calling
    Party Number (CPN) which caller id is derived from. So saying "This
    confidential information breach is caused by the implicit trust of Caller-ID
    as the sole authentication mechanism from the targets phone." is technically
    wrong.

    ----- Original Message -----
    From: "Secure Science Corporation Advisory Notice"
    <bugtraq@securescience.net>
    To: <bugtraq@securityfocus.com>
    Sent: Wednesday, August 11, 2004 5:10 PM
    Subject: SSC Advisory TSA-051 (T-mobile wireless and Verizon Northwest)


    > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
    > Hash: SHA1
    >
    > Secure Science Corporation Advisory TSA-051
    > http://www.securescience.net
    > e-response@securescience.net
    > 877-570-0455
    >
    > - ---------------------------------------------------------
    >
    > T-mobile Wireless and Verizon Northwest are vulnerable to caller-ID
    > authentication spoofing, enabling arbitrary compromise of customer
    > voicemail/message center.
    >
    > - ---------------------------------------------------------------------
    >
    > Vulnerability Classification: Authentication bypass, remote compromise,
    > confidential information breach.
    >
    > Discovery Date: July 09, 2004
    > Vendor Contacted: July 28, 2004
    > Advisory publication date: August 11, 2004
    >
    >
    > Abstract:
    > - ---------
    > T-mobile Wireless and Verizon Northwest (Washington state) grant
    > implicit trust to certain Caller-ID input for receiving voicemails and
    > accessing customer message preferences. Caller-ID spoofing allows
    > forgery of a calling number to the target number. When spoofing the
    > target number while calling T-mobile or Verizon Northwest, the target
    > trusts the CID to be accurate, bypassing the password response, and
    > allows direct access into the targets voicemail message center.
    >
    > Description:
    > - ------------
    > During a recent demo with Caller-ID spoofing, a discovery was made when
    > spoofing the targets own number. When calling the target, and if they
    > did not pick up the call, the voice mail box would go into administrator
    > mode without verifying or authenticating a voice mail box passcode.
    > This confidential information breach is caused by the implicit trust of
    > Caller-ID as the sole authentication mechanism from the targets phone.
    >
    > Particularly T-mobile is of greater concern, as it demonstrates when
    > dealing with the threat model of a lost or stolen phone, an arbitrary
    > entity can listen to the voicemail without authentication from the lost
    > or stolen phone. Most mobile carriers do trust the Caller-ID that is
    > displayed, but still ask for a passcode.
    >
    > Verizon Northwest (formerly GTE) has the same vulnerability, excepting
    > that it is a landline carrier, not a mobile service.
    >
    >
    > Tested Vendors:
    > - ---------------
    > T-Mobile Wireless
    > Verizon Northwest
    >
    > Suspected Vendors:
    > - ------------------
    > Multiple untested Telco vendors
    > Multiple Credit-Card activation protocols
    >
    > Vendor and Patch Information:
    > - -----------------------------
    > Secure Science Corporation has made multiple attempts to contact the
    > vendors with no response.
    >
    > Solution:
    > - ---------
    > Add 2-factor authentication (passcode requirement) by default and cease
    > implicit trust of Caller-ID information.
    >
    > Credits:
    > - --------
    > Secure Science Corporation: Lance James, with many thanks to Samy Kamkar
    > and Dachb0den Labs.
    >
    > Disclaimer:
    > - -----------
    > Secure Science Corporation is not responsible for the misuse of any of
    > the information we provide on this website and/or through our security
    > advisories. Our advisories are a service to our customers intended to
    > promote secure installation and use of Secure Science Corporation

    products.
    > - --
    > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
    > Version: GnuPG v1.2.4 (GNU/Linux)
    > Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://enigmail.mozdev.org
    >
    > iD8DBQFBGos4S5qPmxIxbpkRAhE8AJ936K8F1dfzcCGBHrJH0B 4J1mcwiwCgtyBL
    > Z5HBN6+R9qVvt1k8tgAyPeI=
    > =yDLU
    > -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



  4. #4
    Lance James
    SSC Advisory TSA-051 (T-mobile wireless and Verizon Northwest)
    Gast
    n/a Berichten
    Berichten zijn liked



    Thread Starter

    Re: SSC Advisory TSA-051 (T-mobile wireless and Verizon Northwest)

    Joe Eversole wrote:
    > On Wed, 11 Aug 2004 14:10:18 -0700, Secure Science Corporation
    > Advisory Notice <bugtraq@securescience.net> wrote:
    >
    >
    >>Solution:
    >>- ---------
    >>Add 2-factor authentication (passcode requirement) by default and cease
    >>implicit trust of Caller-ID information.

    >
    >
    > T-Mobile's messaging system (in Indianapolis, at least. I do not know
    > if they have migrated to a single VM system) has a setting the user
    > can specify to require passcode when calling from mobile phone.


    Hence, by default! It is not on by default.


    >
    > --je
    >
    >



    --
    Best Regards,
    Lance James
    Secure Science Corporation
    www.securescience.com

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