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Hello,

About sudo in particular.

* You can force for a prompt (5mn by default on Mac OSX,) adding a line
such as the following in /etc/sudoers (using the visudo command):
Defaults timestamp_timeout =3D 0

* By default users do not authenticate on a per-tty basis. You can
enforce it with the following option:
Defaults tty_tickets

The last is activated by default on GNU/Linux distro Ubuntu. The reading
of the sudoers manual page is a very interesting.

Regards,

--=20
Baptiste MALGUY - System Engineer EASYNET
PGP Fingerprint: 49B0 4F6E 4AA8 B149 B2DF 9267 0F65 6C1C C473 6EC2
www.easynet.com - phone: +33 1 44 54 70 00 - fax: +33 1 44 54 70 01

--

Marvin Simkin wrote:
> I respectfully disagree with this proposal and maybe we should discuss =
it.
>=20
> Being a member of the admin group is NOT 100% equal to being root. Ther=
efore when you switch from admin group to uid=3D0 you are escalating priv=
ileges. A trojan that gets control of an admin's session should not be ab=
le to escalate itself to root without a password prompt, which requires a=
human to decide (rightly or wrongly...) yes I do want to increase the au=
thority of this process.
>=20
> Sure, an admin should be smart enough not to get trojaned, but what if =
they do anyway?
>=20
> Maybe a cracker could write a trojan that esclates itself using the pow=
ers of the admin group, but why make it easier for those who don't know h=
ow?
>=20
> The myth that it should be easy for uneducated users to expose their co=
mputers to harm is one reason why certain other GUI platforms have so man=
y security problems.
>=20
>=20
> host:/tmp1 sysmsimkin$ id
> uid=3D505(sysmsimkin) gid=3D505(sysmsimkin) groups=3D505(sysmsimkin), 8=
1(appserveradm), 79(appserverusr), 80(admin)
> host:/tmp1 sysmsimkin$ ls -ld /tmp1
> drwxr-xr-x 3 501 admin 102 Jun 28 2006 /tmp1
> host:/tmp1 sysmsimkin$ mkdir /tmp1/tmp2
> mkdir: /tmp1/tmp2: Permission denied
> host:/tmp1 sysmsimkin$ /usr/bin/sudo /bin/bash
> Password:
> host:/tmp1 root# mkdir /tmp1/tmp2
> host:/tmp1 root# ls -ld /tmp1/tmp2
> drwxr-xr-x 2 root admin 68 Jan 25 11:20 /tmp1/tmp2
> host:/tmp1 root# exit
> host:/tmp1 sysmsimkin$ rmdir /tmp1/tmp2
> rmdir: /tmp1/tmp2: Permission denied
> host:/tmp1 sysmsimkin$ /usr/bin/sudo /bin/bash
> host:/tmp1 root# rmdir /tmp1/tmp2
> host:/tmp1 root# exit
> host:/tmp1 sysmsimkin$=20
>=20
> More interesting (to me) why wasn't I prompted for a password the secon=
d time? (Yes I know it was designed that way, I'm asking was that the rig=
ht decision.) Presumably there is a window of vulnerability for a few min=
utes AFTER you have been root during which you could fall victim to a tro=
jan.






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