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    Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked
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    Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked

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    762A 3B98 A3C3 96C9 C6B7 582A B88D 52E4 D9F5 7808
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    <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<

    http://www.truthout.org/docs_04/110804Z.shtml
    http://www.commondreams.org/views04/1106-30.htm

    Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked
    By Thom Hartmann
    CommonDreams.org

    Saturday 06 November 2004

    When I spoke with Jeff Fisher this morning (Saturday, November 06, 2004),
    the Democratic candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives from
    Florida's 16th District said he was waiting for the FBI to show up. Fisher
    has evidence, he says, not only that the Florida election was hacked, but
    of who hacked it and how. And not just this year, he said, but that these
    same people had previously hacked the Democratic primary race in 2002 so
    that Jeb Bush would not have to run against Janet Reno, who presented a
    real threat to Jeb, but instead against Bill McBride, who Jeb beat.

    "It was practice for a national effort," Fisher told me.

    And some believe evidence is accumulating that the national effort
    happened on November 2, 2004.

    The State of Florida, for example, publishes a county-by-county record of
    votes cast and people registered to vote by party affiliation. Net denizen
    Kathy Dopp compiled the official state information into a table, available
    at [11]http://ustogether.org/Florida_Election.htm, and noticed something
    startling.

    While the heavily scrutinized touch-screen voting machines seemed to
    produce results in which the registered Democrat/Republican ratios largely
    matched the Kerry/Bush vote, in Florida's counties using results from
    optically scanned paper ballots - fed into a central tabulator PC and thus
    vulnerable to hacking - the results seem to contain substantial anomalies.

    In Baker County, for example, with 12,887 registered voters, 69.3% of them
    Democrats and 24.3% of them Republicans, the vote was only 2,180 for Kerry
    and 7,738 for Bush, the opposite of what is seen everywhere else in the
    country where registered Democrats largely voted for Kerry.

    In Dixie County, with 4,988 registered voters, 77.5% of them Democrats and
    a mere 15% registered as Republicans, only 1,959 people voted for Kerry,
    but 4,433 voted for Bush.

    The pattern repeats over and over again - but only in the counties where
    optical scanners were used. Franklin County, 77.3% registered Democrats,
    went 58.5% for Bush. Holmes County, 72.7% registered Democrats, went
    77.25% for Bush.

    Yet in the touch-screen counties, where investigators may have been more
    vigorously looking for such anomalies, high percentages of registered
    Democrats generally equaled high percentages of votes for Kerry. (I had
    earlier reported that county size was a variable - this turns out not to
    be the case. Just the use of touch-screens versus optical scanners.)

    More visual analysis of the results can be seen at
    [12]http://ustogether.org/election04/FloridaDataStats.htm, and
    [13]www.rubberbug.com/temp/Florida2004chart.htm. Note the trend line - the
    only variable that determines a swing toward Bush was the use of optical
    scan machines.

    One possible explanation for this is the "Dixiecrat" theory, that in
    Florida white voters (particularly the rural ones) have been registered as
    Democrats for years, but voting Republican since Reagan. Looking at the
    2000 statistics, also available on Dopp's site, there are similar
    anomalies, although the trends are not as strong as in 2004. But some
    suggest the 2000 election may have been questionable in Florida, too.

    One of the people involved in Dopp's analysis noted that it may be
    possible to determine the validity of the "rural Democrat" theory by
    comparing Florida's white rural counties to those of Pennsylvania, another
    swing state but one that went for Kerry, as the exit polls there
    predicted. Interestingly, the Pennsylvania analysis, available at
    [14]http://ustogether.org/election04/PA_vote_patt.htm, doesn't show the
    same kind of swings as does Florida, lending credence to the possibility
    of problems in Florida.

    Even more significantly, Dopp had first run the analysis while filtering
    out smaller (rural) counties, and still found that the only variable that
    accounted for a swing toward Republican voting was the use of optical-scan
    machines, whereas counties with touch-screen machines generally didn't
    swing - regardless of size.

    Others offer similar insights, based on other data. A professor at the
    University of Massachusetts, Amherst, noted that in Florida the vote to
    raise the minimum wage was approved by 72%, although Kerry got 48%. "The
    correlation between voting for the minimum wage increase and voting for
    Kerry isn't likely to be perfect," he noted, "but one would normally
    expect that the gap - of 1.5 million votes - to be far smaller than it
    was."

    While all of this may or may not be evidence of vote tampering, it again
    brings the nation back to the question of why several states using
    electronic voting machines or scanners programmed by private, for-profit
    corporations and often connected to modems produced votes inconsistent
    with exit poll numbers.

    Those exit poll results have been a problem for reporters ever since
    Election Day.

    Election night, I'd been doing live election coverage for WDEV, one of the
    radio stations that carries my syndicated show, and, just after midnight,
    during the 12:20 a.m. Associated Press Radio News feed, I was startled to
    hear the reporter detail how Karen Hughes had earlier sat George W. Bush
    down to inform him that he'd lost the election. The exit polls were clear:
    Kerry was winning in a landslide. "Bush took the news stoically," noted
    the AP report.

    But then the computers reported something different. In several pivotal
    states.

    Conservatives see a conspiracy here: They think the exit polls were
    rigged.

    Dick Morris, the infamous political consultant to the first Clinton
    campaign who became a Republican consultant and Fox News regular, wrote an
    article for [15]The Hill, the publication read by every political junkie
    in Washington, DC, in which he made a couple of brilliant points.

    "Exit Polls are almost never wrong," Morris wrote. "They eliminate the two
    major potential fallacies in survey research by correctly separating
    actual voters from those who pretend they will cast ballots but never do
    and by substituting actual observation for guesswork in judging the
    relative turnout of different parts of the state."

    He added: "So, according to ABC-TVs exit polls, for example, Kerry was
    slated to carry Florida, Ohio, New Mexico, Colorado, Nevada, and Iowa, all
    of which Bush carried. The only swing state the network had going to Bush
    was West Virginia, which the president won by 10 points."

    Yet a few hours after the exit polls were showing a clear Kerry sweep, as
    the computerized vote numbers began to come in from the various states the
    election was called for Bush.

    How could this happen?

    On the CNBC TV show "Topic A With Tina Brown," several months ago, Howard
    Dean had filled in for Tina Brown as guest host. His guest was Bev Harris,
    the Seattle grandmother who started [16]www.blackboxvoting.org from her
    living room. Bev pointed out that regardless of how votes were tabulated
    (other than hand counts, only done in odd places like small towns in
    Vermont), the real "counting" is done by computers. Be they Diebold
    Opti-Scan machines, which read paper ballots filled in by pencil or ink in
    the voter's hand, or the scanners that read punch cards, or the machines
    that simply record a touch of the screen, in all cases the final tally is
    sent to a "central tabulator" machine.

    That central tabulator computer is a Windows-based PC.

    "In a voting system," Harris explained to Dean on national television,
    "you have all the different voting machines at all the different polling
    places, sometimes, as in a county like mine, there's a thousand polling
    places in a single county. All those machines feed into the one machine so
    it can add up all the votes. So, of course, if you were going to do
    something you shouldn't to a voting machine, would it be more convenient
    to do it to each of the 4000 machines, or just come in here and deal with
    all of them at once?"

    Dean nodded in rhetorical agreement, and Harris continued. "What surprises
    people is that the central tabulator is just a PC, like what you and I
    use. It's just a regular computer."

    "So," Dean said, "anybody who can hack into a PC can hack into a central
    tabulator?"

    Harris nodded affirmation, and pointed out how Diebold uses a program
    called GEMS, which fills the screen of the PC and effectively turns it
    into the central tabulator system. "This is the official program that the
    County Supervisor sees," she said, pointing to a PC that was sitting
    between them loaded with Diebold's software.

    Bev then had Dean open the GEMS program to see the results of a test
    election. They went to the screen titled "Election Summary Report" and
    waited a moment while the PC "adds up all the votes from all the various
    precincts," and then saw that in this faux election Howard Dean had 1000
    votes, Lex Luthor had 500, and Tiger Woods had none. Dean was winning.

    "Of course, you can't tamper with this software," Harris noted. Diebold
    wrote a pretty good program.

    But, it's running on a Windows PC.

    So Harris had Dean close the Diebold GEMS software, go back to the normal
    Windows PC desktop, click on the "My Computer" icon, choose "Local Disk
    C:," open the folder titled GEMS, and open the sub-folder "LocalDB" which,
    Harris noted, "stands for local database, that's where they keep the
    votes." Harris then had Dean double-click on a file in that folder titled
    "Central Tabulator Votes," which caused the PC to open the vote count in a
    database program like Excel.

    In the "Sum of the Candidates" row of numbers, she found that in one
    precinct Dean had received 800 votes and Lex Luthor had gotten 400.

    "Let's just flip those," Harris said, as Dean cut and pasted the numbers
    from one cell into the other. "And," she added magnanimously, "let's give
    100 votes to Tiger."

    They closed the database, went back into the official GEMS software "the
    legitimate way, you're the county supervisor and you're checking on the
    progress of your election."

    As the screen displayed the official voter tabulation, Harris said, "And
    you can see now that Howard Dean has only 500 votes, Lex Luthor has 900,
    and Tiger Woods has 100." Dean, the winner, was now the loser.

    Harris sat up a bit straighter, smiled, and said, "We just edited an
    election, and it took us 90 seconds."

    On live national television. (You can see the clip on
    [17]www.votergate.tv.) And they had left no tracks whatsoever, Harris
    said, noting that it would be nearly impossible for the election software
    - - or a County election official - to know that the vote database had been
    altered.

    Which brings us back to Morris and those pesky exit polls that had Karen
    Hughes telling George W. Bush that he'd lost the election in a landslide.

    Morris's conspiracy theory is that the exit polls "were sabotage" to cause
    people in the western states to not bother voting for Bush, since the
    networks would call the election based on the exit polls for Kerry. But
    the networks didn't do that, and had never intended to.

    According to congressional candidate Fisher, it makes far more sense that
    the exit polls were right - they weren't done on Diebold PCs - and that
    the vote itself was hacked.

    And not only for the presidential candidate - Jeff Fisher thinks this hit
    him and pretty much every other Democratic candidate for national office
    in the most-hacked swing states.

    So far, the only national "mainstream" media to come close to this story
    was Keith Olbermann on his show Friday night, November 5th, when he noted
    that it was curious that all the voting machine irregularities so far
    uncovered seem to favor Bush. In the meantime, the Washington Post and
    other media are now going through single-bullet-theory-like contortions to
    explain how the exit polls had failed.

    But I agree with Fox's Dick Morris on this one, at least in large part.
    Wrapping up his story for The Hill, Morris wrote in his final paragraph,
    "This was no mere mistake. Exit polls cannot be as wrong across the board
    as they were on election night. I suspect foul play."

    - -------

    Thom Hartmann ([18]thom at thomhartmann.com) is a Project Censored
    Award-winning best-selling author and host of a nationally syndicated
    daily progressive talk show. [19]www.thomhartmann.com. His most recent
    books are "[20]The Last Hours of Ancient Sunlight," "[21]We The People: A
    Call To Take Back America," and "[22]What Would Jefferson Do?: A Return To
    Democracy."

    References

    11. http://ustogether.org/Florida_Election.htm
    12. http://ustogether.org/election04/FloridaDataStats.htm
    13. http://www.rubberbug.com/temp/Florida2004chart.htm
    14. http://ustogether.org/election04/PA_vote_patt.htm
    15. http://www.thehill.com/morris/110404.aspx
    16. http://www.blackboxvoting.org/
    17. http://www.votergate.tv/
    18. mailto:thom@thomhartmann.com
    19. http://www.thomhartmann.com/
    20. http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/AS...-20/ref=nosim/
    21. http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/AS...-20/ref=nosim/
    22. http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/AS...-20/ref=nosim/

    ###
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  2. #2
    Jay D. Dyson
    Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked
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    Re: Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked

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    On Mon, 8 Nov 2004, Atom 'Smasher' wrote:

    > Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked


    Read the whole thing and didn't see any evidence. Just wild
    speculation and baseless conjecture. Hell, there were countless counties
    across the nation in which more people were registered to vote than were
    eligible residents, but -- for some reason -- that ain't news.

    Why was this politically-motivated nonsense approved for Bugtraq?
    The Democrats lost. Get over it already.

    - -Jay

    ( ( _______
    )) )) .-"There's always time for a good cup of coffee"-. >====<--.
    C|~~|C|~~| (>----- Jay D. Dyson -- jdyson@treachery.net -----<) | = |-'
    `--' `--' `------ Burn me up and I'll burn you down. ------' `------'

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  3. #3
    Jay D. Dyson
    Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked
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    Re: Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked

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    On Wed, 10 Nov 2004, Peter Conrad wrote:

    > > Why was this politically-motivated nonsense approved for Bugtraq?

    >
    > the security of electronic voting machines has been discussed on bugtraq
    > before. It *is* a computer security issue and therefore on-topic.


    That's all well and good, but this most recent post was just
    politically-motivated crybaby bullcrap. I've read horoscopes with more
    factual information in them.

    - -Jay

    ( ( _______
    )) )) .-"There's always time for a good cup of coffee"-. >====<--.
    C|~~|C|~~| (>----- Jay D. Dyson -- jdyson@treachery.net -----<) | = |-'
    `--' `--' `------ Burn me up and I'll burn you down. ------' `------'

    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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  4. #4
    Jei
    Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked
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    Re: Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked

    On Tue, 9 Nov 2004, Jay D. Dyson wrote:

    > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
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    > On Mon, 8 Nov 2004, Atom 'Smasher' wrote:
    >
    >> Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked

    >
    > Read the whole thing and didn't see any evidence. Just wild
    > speculation and baseless conjecture. Hell, there were countless counties
    > across the nation in which more people were registered to vote than were
    > eligible residents, but -- for some reason -- that ain't news.


    It would be _major_ news, were it not America where it happened.
    Even India managed to hold a secure digital election recently,
    without any such major exit poll or other discrepancies happening.

    Also note that Americans aren't the only people in the world with
    capable intelligence agencies. Teenage kid hackers aren't the only
    people who might influence US elections' outcomes, given a viable
    chance. You need to consider all the factors.

    Digital voting needs to be as secure and reliable as bank accounts
    are from an independent (democratic) nation's national security point
    of view. A digital vote discrepancy == national bank account discrepancy,
    in it's importance, in this regard.

    Arguing that vote discrepancies don't really matter, is like a system
    admin arguing that system binary checksum discrepancies do not matter.

    In any case, it means you're royally f*cked, and although you may wish
    to fantasize otherwise, it doesn't change the reality.

    You need to know that you're secure, or your security people aren't
    doing their job.

    // Jei

    http://www.infosecwriters.com/hhworld/hh9/voting.txt

    Hitchhiker's World (Issue #9)
    http://www.infosecwriters.com/hhworld/

    Observable Elections
    --------------------

    Vipul Ved Prakash <mail@vipul.net>
    November 2004


    This is an interesting time for electronic voting. India,
    the largest democracy in the world, went completely paper-
    free for its general elections earlier this year. For the
    first time, some 387 million people expressed their
    electoral right electronically. Despite initial concerns
    about security and correctness of the system, the election
    process was a smashing success. Over a million electronic
    voting machines (EVMs) were deployed, 8000 metric tonnes of
    paper saved[1] and the results made public within few hours
    of the final vote. Given the quarrelsome and heavily
    litigated nature of Indian democracy, a lot of us were
    expecting post-election drama, but only a few, if any,
    fingers were found pointing.

    Things didn't fare so well in the United States. The
    Dieobold electronic machines, slated for use in many states
    for the November 2004 Federal elections, turned out to have
    rather large security holes. Cryptography experts, Avi Rubin
    et al, did a formal analysis of the machines and found that
    they could be subverted to introduce votes that were never
    casted[2]. An independent government-backed analysis
    confirmed this[3] and concluded that the Diebold voting
    system "as implemented in policy, procedure, and technology,
    is at a high risk of compromise."

    It is clear, even to a cursory observer, that Diebold
    systems are sloppily designed, never mind the sloppiness is
    a function of incompetence or intent. The recent controversy
    from the "Black Box Voting" security advisory titled "the
    Diebold GEMS central tabulator contains a stunning security
    hole"[4] has added to the confusion. It claims that a code
    entered at a remote location can replace the real vote count
    with a fabricated one. This security hole, discovered last
    year, is still not fixed says the advisory. In response,
    Diebold claims that this is possible, but only in debug
    mode, which does little to make people confortable.

    What is disturbing to me as a technologist is the
    burgeoning public opinion that electronics is an unviable
    medium for conducting the serious business of elections.
    Over the last year I've seen numerous formal reports and
    articles in popular press[5] equating the failures of
    Diebold systems with the untenability of electronic voting.
    This is rather silly. Diebold systems are not only poorly
    engineered, they are also seriously flawed in design. Even
    if they were immaculately bug-free, they are so far from
    what electronic voting systems should be, that I have
    trouble categorizing them as "voting systems". "Electronic
    counters" is more accurate.

    Various augmentations have been proposed to Diebold systems;
    most revolve around parallel paper trails. Verified
    Voting[6] for example proposes that a vote be printed based
    on the voter's touch-screen selection, so the voter can
    touch, feel and verify their vote before casting it into a
    traditional ballet box. These votes would then be processed
    with an OCR type machine to compute a cumulative result and
    the physical votes would be saved so an independent party
    can verify the electronic result at a latter date. This is a
    reasonable tradeoff -- after all integrity of elections is
    way more important than saving trees and time.

    While this is the best recommendation for the upcoming
    elections, it subtly promotes the primacy of paper and
    distrust in electrons. We know that paper elections are no
    more secure. The history of vote tampering in paper based
    elections is quite illustrious (I'll simply refer the gentle
    reader to [7]) and the reason electronics was considered in
    the first place was to eliminate such tampering. Verified
    Voting recommends that count of the physical votes is to be
    considered superior than that of the electronic counterparts
    in case of a difference. What happens if the process of this
    count is tampered using traditional methods? We are back to
    square one.

    The central point that I want to get across in this paper is
    that the promise of electronic voting is not merely a
    quicker, slightly more secure and ecologically enlightened
    replacement for paper elections. Electronic voting, if
    implemented correctly, could be a major qualitative leap,
    not only changing the way in which we approach democratic
    elections, but also the the way in which we expect a
    democratic government to function.

    Cryptographic Integrity

    I want to draw attention to the work done by cryptographic
    community in the last 20 years to study, formalize and solve
    many of the problems of Internet Voting. This area of work
    is focused on building election systems that leave behind a
    trail of mathematical proofs of the integrity of the voting
    process. With mathematical solutions to the common issues of
    vote tampering, it becomes unnecessary to trust election
    officials and it becomes possible to build voting systems
    that are open and universally verifiable.

    A voting system for appointing a democratic government has
    certain "ideal properties". These are rather obvious, but I
    recount them for the purpose of this discussion. First, all
    votes must be counted exactly like they were casted.
    Altering a vote, or leaving one out from the final tally
    must be impossible. Ballot stuffing, ie. artificial
    injection of invalid votes must be impossible as well. The
    system should reject non-eligible voters, and ensure
    eligible users can cast only a single vote. And, finally,
    votes must be absolutely anonymous -- even the voter should
    be unable to prove the way in which they voted. Systems like
    Diebold's depend on large-scale observation to uphold the
    ideal properties. Large-scale observation is hard, and once
    an act of tampering is done, there is little that can be
    done to detect or correct it. The attacks such as the one
    described by the Black Box Voting advisory are particularly
    heinous, since they compromise the entire election process.

    The ideal properties are true in paper elections when they
    are implemented perfectly, but the nature of paper precludes
    proofs of correctness without compromising anonymity. The
    problems are much the same as in the "Electronic Counter"
    systems; without correctness proofs, it is largely
    infeasible to detect and correct tampering.

    Cryptographers have been trying to emulate the property of
    anonymity that is inherent to paper when it us used as cash
    or votes. The research in the field has led to invention of
    several mathematical primitives and computing systems that
    not only model paper but go beyond to provide proofs of the
    properties they emulate. Techniques like blind signatures,
    homomorphic encryption, digital mixes and onion routing have
    been used to build systems that provide strong anonymity.

    The pioneering cryptographer David Chaum introduced the
    blind signature in order to build permit truly anonymous
    interaction on the Internet[8]. Since then, they have been
    applied to all manner of problems from untraceable
    electronic cash to electronic voting schemes. Blind
    signatures are a class of digital signatures that allow a
    document to be signed without revealing its contents. The
    effect is similar to placing a document and a sheet of
    carbon paper inside an envelope. When the envelope is
    signed, the signature transfers to the document and remains
    on it even when the envelope is removed.

    In his paper, Chaum hinted that blind signatures could be
    used for secret ballot elections. Fujioka, Okamoto, and
    Ohta[9] created the first significant blind signature based
    voting protocol, which made it practical to use blind
    signatures in democratic elections. However, some problems
    were discovered in their work, most notably the system's
    vulnerablity to a corrupt election authority. I present a
    system, dubbed ``Athens'', that builds on their work, but
    solves several problems in their model. I also focus on a
    real-world election system, rather than an Internet one, and
    adopt a pragmatic approach, in that I make use of physical
    resources like volunteers and physical infrastructure
    usually available for large-scale democratic elections.
    Athens also borrows elements and thinking from the
    Sensus[10] system and David Chaum's recent work on Visual
    Cryptography[11].

    Design of Athens

    The basic procedure for conducting a democratic election is
    fairly standard. The procedure has four tasks: Registration,
    Validation, Collection and Tallying. In Athens, these four
    tasks are carried out with a few specialized machines and
    software, most of which are connected through the Internet.
    While Athens employs an Election Authority to oversee the
    process of elections, it does away with the dependence on
    trustworthiness of one. Athens philosophy is that there are
    no truly non-partisan parties; even the Election Authority
    can't be completely trusted. The Athens model is closer to a
    "game" between contesting parties, such that the only way to
    cheat in the game is for all competitors to collude - an
    axiomatic impossibility. The Election Authority performs
    tactical tasks to optimize the election process, but all
    tasks performed by the Authority are open to review by
    competing parties.

    Registration

    Registration is the process of determining eligible voters,
    and is conducted by the "Registrar" -- a distributed
    authority put in place by the Election Authority. The Athens
    registration process involves validating voters (through
    traditional means) and registering their "Voter Public Key"
    in the "Register." The corresponding "Voter Secret Key"
    remains with the voter, magnetically encoded (or bar coded
    for cheaper implementation) on a "Voting Card".

    The keys are generated through the "Voting Card Creator
    Machine". The Card Creator Machine is also implemented as
    software that can be used by a voter on their home computer.
    It is not hard to imagine Card Creators installed in local
    registration offices or even at Kinko's and shopping malls,
    where they charge a few dollars for generating a card.
    Fairness in design is important, because Card Creators could
    compromise the security of the system by storing the key
    pairs they generate.

    A card creator is mostly an RSA key generator - it needs
    computing power of a 300 Mhz PC, and is constructed fairly
    cheaply. Once the voter enters their personal information
    into the machine, it spits out two cards: one with the
    public key, that is handed over to the Registrar and the
    other with the secret key and identification information
    required by the Election Authority (like the social security
    number of the voter.) The second card is known as the
    "Voting Card" and is used to validate the voter at the time
    of elections. Both cards also contain a large random number,
    known as the Voter Id. This is used throughout the voting
    process to facilitate lookups in the Register without
    compromising the privacy of the voter.

    Once all voters have handed their Voter Public Key Card over
    to the Registrar, the registration process is considered to
    be complete. As with traditional elections, there is a cut-
    off date for this process.

    On completion of registration, the Election Authority hands
    the Register over to all the competitors. The competitors
    then check every 1 in 1000 entries (or more according to
    their capacity) to ensure that they belong to a legitimate
    voter, i.e. it isn't a fake entry inserted by a corrupt
    competitor to stuff the ballot. This process is woefully
    lacking in elections of today, and a hence a major vector
    for election fraud. Mathematics can do little to alleviate
    the dangers of registering fake voters, but competitors who
    depend on the correctness of the Register and raise funds
    for the purpose can easily perform this task. Register
    verification would be a lucrative business for independent
    professional services organizations, so it is not hard to
    imagine such organizations sprouting up to assume delegation
    of this responsibility.

    The competitors also put the Register on the Internet before
    the election so that voters can ensure their voter key is
    present in all copies of the Register. When requested, each
    competing party provides a digitally signed proof that the
    voter is registered to vote, i.e. their key is present in
    the Register. The voter, if denied the right to vote, can
    take this proof to a court of law. A pre-voting verification
    of eligibility limits the kind of fiasco that occurred in
    Florida during the Presidential elections of 2000, where a
    large number of people were denied vote.

    Validation

    In most electronic voting protocols, there exists the notion
    of the "Validator" - a party that holds the Register and
    validates voters during the election. In Athens, the
    competing parties, that were handed a copy of the Register
    in the previous step, all serve as Validators. Athens,
    therefore, is a multi-validator system. It is reasonable to
    assume that independents or fiscally constrained parties
    would team up and have a single Validator represent them.

    Validators are connected to the Internet and run Validation
    software, that accepts validation requests over a TCP port.
    The Validators are firewall'ed off to accept data only from
    certain IP addresses. The Electronic Voting Machines talk to
    the Validators via a Proxy. EVMs could theoretically talk
    directly to Validators, but the reasons for using a proxy
    will become apparent later. The Proxy is operated by the
    Election Authority and observed by representatives from all
    competing parties.

    Validators have their own RSA key pair, the public portion
    of which is published widely over the Internet. They also
    maintain two lists (other than the Register). This is the
    list of voters who have casted a vote and a list of
    corresponding validation requests.

    Before the commencement of the election, the Election
    Authority chooses a a random number which is known as the
    "Election Number". The only property of this number is its
    uniqueness to the election - it should not have been used in
    a previous election. The Election Number is distributed to
    all Validators.

    Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) used in Athens are quite
    unlike Diebold's or the ones used in the Indian elections.
    Athens' EVMs are simply "agents" that vote on behalf of the
    voter. Each EVM has an Id and a RSA key pair. The public
    part of the EVM key is published widely over the Internet.
    Communications initiated by the EVM are signed with EVMs
    secret key. The elections are considered formally commenced,
    when the Validators broadcast the Election Number and their
    public keys to EVMs via the Proxy.

    The Athens Voting Protocol

    The voter enters a private booth and swipes their Voting
    Card on the EVM. The EVM reads the secret key and the Voter
    Id off the Card. The EVM has a little printer attached to
    it, much like a cash register receipt printer, on which it
    prints out the Voter Id. It the sends the voter Id off to
    the Validators via the proxy to initiate a "voting session"
    on behalf of the voter. If the voter has already casted a
    vote, Validators return a "proof" of previously casted vote.
    The proof and its implications are discussed a little later.
    If there's no previous vote, the Validators send a positive
    acknowledgment and the EVM asks the voter to cast a ballot.
    The voter enters their vote using the on-screen display. The
    EVM concatenates the Voter's choice with the Election Number
    (EN) and the result is encrypted with a secret key (randomly
    generated) using a symmetric cipher like AES. The encrypted
    ballot is then blinded. At this point, the EVM has:

    [....]

    http://www.infosecwriters.com/hhworld/hh9/voting.txt


  5. #5
    bkfsec
    Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked
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    Thread Starter

    Re: Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked

    Jay D. Dyson wrote:

    >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
    >Hash: SHA1
    >
    >On Mon, 8 Nov 2004, Atom 'Smasher' wrote:
    >
    >
    >
    >>Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked
    >>
    >>

    >
    > Read the whole thing and didn't see any evidence. Just wild
    >speculation and baseless conjecture. Hell, there were countless counties
    >across the nation in which more people were registered to vote than were
    >eligible residents, but -- for some reason -- that ain't news.
    >
    > Why was this politically-motivated nonsense approved for Bugtraq?
    >The Democrats lost. Get over it already.
    >
    >
    >

    If you follow the links in the story there are plenty of anomolies that
    would be statistically impossible if there wasn't rigging. The Florida
    numbers indicate rigging because you can directly correlate pattern
    differences between the expected vote and the actual counted vote in
    each county. The variable used to correlate this is the type of voting
    machine.

    Since the counties are distributed throughout Florida, there is no other
    explanation for the numbers coming out the way that they did. The
    implication, of course, is that someone cracked into the Op-Scan central
    tabulator and modified the numbers.

    This isn't reaching, it's what's actually there. Feel free to check the
    numbers yourself.

    The point is that there are questions tied to this. Election legitimacy
    is important - at least to progressives it is. Why is that so hard for
    you to understand?

    Election legitimacy is a non-partisan issue. Unless you want to argue
    otherwise, you have no point to make.

    -Barry

    p.s. I find it interesting that you attack others for being partisan
    when you're so clearly partisan you'd have to be blind not to see it.


  6. #6
    Rick Crelia
    Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked
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    Thread Starter

    Re: Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked


    Well, it's been a while since I had statistics, but I'd say those
    observed deltas for the Op-Scan Precinct table look mighty damn
    improbable, especially compared to the corresponding numbers in
    the table for the Touch Screen votes:

    http://ustogether.org/Florida_Election.htm

    You don't need to be a rocket scientist to see that much, nor
    to expect a similar pattern of results between the two data sets
    given their otherwise strongly shared commonalities. Ok, maybe a
    science-oriented person, but definitely not a NASA guru.

    I think it's relevant to Bugtraq at least as much as anything
    Diebold-related has been before the election. Before, we simply had
    a bunch of conspiracy theories about a oddly designed voting system
    from a less than forthcoming corporation which tried to cover up the
    (now public) exposure of myriad security problems with said system.

    Of course, now there's a little more at stake than just conspiracy
    theories about big bad companies and crappy software. It's about
    the integrity of our national elections. I am a big fan of *lots*
    of discussion when it comes to the topic of someone possibly playing
    parlor games with the electorate and our political welfare. No matter
    which candidate wins an election, the results should be supportable
    by a verifiable, immutable audit trail from vote to tabulation. With
    the use of central tabulation systems from Diebold and what we know
    about them (and did know about them prior to 11/2/2004) we do not
    have that sort of audit trail.

    --rc

    --
    *========================================*
    Rick Crelia - rick.crelia@oregonstate.edu
    OSU Libraries - Dept of Library Technology
    Corvallis, OR 97331 - 541.737.8972

    p.s.

    BTW, your PGP key sig below doesn't match the one on your website, so
    I have to assume that this post was from the guy who has presumably
    been jacking your sig, according to the note on your home page.


    On Tue, Nov 09, 2004 at 10:55:34AM -0800, Jay D. Dyson spake thusly:
    > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
    > Hash: SHA1
    >
    > On Mon, 8 Nov 2004, Atom 'Smasher' wrote:
    >
    > > Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked

    >
    > Read the whole thing and didn't see any evidence. Just wild
    > speculation and baseless conjecture. Hell, there were countless counties
    > across the nation in which more people were registered to vote than were
    > eligible residents, but -- for some reason -- that ain't news.
    >
    > Why was this politically-motivated nonsense approved for Bugtraq?
    > The Democrats lost. Get over it already.
    >
    > - -Jay
    >
    > ( ( _______
    > )) )) .-"There's always time for a good cup of coffee"-. >====<--.
    > C|~~|C|~~| (>----- Jay D. Dyson -- jdyson@treachery.net -----<) | = |-'
    > `--' `--' `------ Burn me up and I'll burn you down. ------' `------'
    >
    > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
    > Version: GnuPG v1.2.6 (TreacherOS)
    > Comment: See http://www.treachery.net/~jdyson/ for current keys.
    >
    > iD8DBQFBkRKqBYoRACwSF0cRAiAYAJ9bLRE5f7tj5+eNnG6MxN 6IWz1fBQCgu6f+
    > 0Lyb/rZfle+xo51p7isdwjc=
    > =2a4A
    > -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



  7. #7
    Atom 'Smasher'
    Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked
    Gast
    n/a Berichten
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    Thread Starter

    Re: Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked

    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
    Hash: SHA256

    On Tue, 9 Nov 2004, Jay D. Dyson wrote:

    > On Mon, 8 Nov 2004, Atom 'Smasher' wrote:
    >
    >> Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked

    >
    > Read the whole thing and didn't see any evidence. Just wild
    > speculation and baseless conjecture. Hell, there were countless
    > counties across the nation in which more people were registered to vote
    > than were eligible residents, but -- for some reason -- that ain't news.
    >
    > Why was this politically-motivated nonsense approved for Bugtraq?
    > The Democrats lost. Get over it already.

    ====================

    there is a statistically significant deviation that correlates to
    particular equipment: this *IS* a technology and security issue *NOT* a
    political issue (although there are certainly political implications).

    i've gotten quite a bit of hate mail over this, but if there were
    allegations that the vote was hacked in favor of kerry (hypothetically,
    let's say in a state where kerry's brother were governor) i'm sure there
    would be quite a bit of interest among those who now claim that this is
    irrelevant, off topic, sore losers, etc.

    the issue really is bigger than who won or lost... it's about how the game
    is played. as computer security professionals we owe it to ourselves to
    take this sort of allegation very seriously *regardless* of what candidate
    we prefer.


    - --
    ...atom

    _________________________________________
    PGP key - http://atom.smasher.org/pgp.txt
    762A 3B98 A3C3 96C9 C6B7 582A B88D 52E4 D9F5 7808
    -------------------------------------------------

    "Never forget that everything Hitler did
    in Germany was legal."
    -- Martin Luther King, Jr
    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
    Version: GnuPG v1.3.6 (FreeBSD)
    Comment: What is this gibberish?
    Comment: http://atom.smasher.org/links/#digital_signatures

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    NcxgxHmo4I877x7c1TwtqRKjaiQ8JGO6DGoRtinxgbkavA388T l+dUlENinWiNbL
    hUMEqr9NOkWiFGvLRwXaXDn1ObwIHFjVaMJqndGZMKWd10nUTM Vttr0+sQfPGH6L
    liykIOzDMklXBk1qs6fhpjeZfYAuLmhOzGBZwCPqDlTCC4wYeD sX40wWBAREl5uE
    CUA6g3bzp5GtL1P5E9Km20l6sazrbOYU23yvXyDnUmQ54CC+3f Nu3SkNxXmv0/U=
    =C16d
    -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

  8. #8
    Peter Conrad
    Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked
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    Thread Starter

    Re: Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked

    Hi,

    On Tue, Nov 09, 2004 at 10:55:34AM -0800, Jay D. Dyson wrote:
    >
    > Why was this politically-motivated nonsense approved for Bugtraq?


    the security of electronic voting machines has been discussed on bugtraq
    before. It *is* a computer security issue and therefore on-topic.

    Bye,
    Peter
    --
    Peter Conrad Tel: +49 6102 / 80 99 072
    [ t]ivano Software GmbH Fax: +49 6102 / 80 99 071
    Bahnhofstr. 18 http://www.tivano.de/
    63263 Neu-Isenburg

    Germany

  9. #9
    David Hayden
    Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked
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    Thread Starter

    RE: Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked

    It is not a statistical deviation when compared to the two previous
    elections in the same areas. The article simply wrote that off as
    probable fraud then too. Hardly objectivism nor computer news worthy. It
    also neglected to mention when quoting Dick Morris that the exit poll
    sampling of women was way higher than actual turn out, which is why the
    exit polls were abandoned as inaccurate... And Dick Morris was the first
    one to abandon them. Just as the exit polls were abandoned in 2000 for
    the same reason. Unlike phone polling which can verify the demographics
    of where it is calling, exit polls are historically not accurate.

    Three elections in a row (2000, 2002, & 2004) show those counties voting
    in the proportions they did. Computer fraud would require that each
    county have a hacker, that these hackers had access to the final numbers
    for 3 elections in a row, and that they were able to use similar
    proportions each time.

    I know a lot of Dems that voted Republican this year, even some in
    Florida. They are not a statistical anomaly IMO. Nor is it computer news
    worthy. What would be though is to talk about how online vote
    registration by groups like Moveon.org caused several counties in Ohio
    to have more registered voters than actual people. That was verified
    before the election but there was nothing Ohio could do about it because
    of how we count votes anonymously. That kind of high tech fraud is
    something that needs to be addressed either by different voter
    verification (a utility bill can be used where I am from regardless of
    the date stamp) or by not being anonymous. Losing anonymity is not
    likely so we need to tighten down on the high-tech ways we have of
    verifying peoples identity before they are allowed to register to vote.

    The article had two overall points.=20
    1. People can't possibly have been that Republican for 3 votes in a row
    2. Windows can't possibly be seen as the correct place to put votes

    Both subjective. Neither computer news worthy IMO. High-tech voter
    registration fraud is the bigger story and was unfortunately ignored.
    =20

    -----Original Message-----
    From: Atom 'Smasher' [mailto:atom@suspicious.org]=20
    Sent: Wednesday, November 10, 2004 12:54 AM
    To: Jay D. Dyson
    Cc: Bugtraq
    Subject: Re: Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked

    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
    Hash: SHA256

    On Tue, 9 Nov 2004, Jay D. Dyson wrote:

    > On Mon, 8 Nov 2004, Atom 'Smasher' wrote:
    >
    >> Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked

    >
    > Read the whole thing and didn't see any evidence. Just wild=20
    > speculation and baseless conjecture. Hell, there were countless=20
    > counties across the nation in which more people were registered to=20
    > vote than were eligible residents, but -- for some reason -- that

    ain't news.
    >
    > Why was this politically-motivated nonsense approved for

    Bugtraq?=20
    > The Democrats lost. Get over it already.

    =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3 D=3D=3D=3D

    there is a statistically significant deviation that correlates to
    particular equipment: this *IS* a technology and security issue *NOT* a
    political issue (although there are certainly political implications).

    i've gotten quite a bit of hate mail over this, but if there were
    allegations that the vote was hacked in favor of kerry (hypothetically,
    let's say in a state where kerry's brother were governor) i'm sure there
    would be quite a bit of interest among those who now claim that this is
    irrelevant, off topic, sore losers, etc.

    the issue really is bigger than who won or lost... it's about how the
    game is played. as computer security professionals we owe it to
    ourselves to take this sort of allegation very seriously *regardless* of
    what candidate we prefer.


    - --=20
    ...atom

    _________________________________________
    PGP key - http://atom.smasher.org/pgp.txt
    762A 3B98 A3C3 96C9 C6B7 582A B88D 52E4 D9F5 7808
    -------------------------------------------------

    "Never forget that everything Hitler did
    in Germany was legal."
    -- Martin Luther King, Jr
    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
    Version: GnuPG v1.3.6 (FreeBSD)
    Comment: What is this gibberish?
    Comment: http://atom.smasher.org/links/#digital_signatures

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    liykIOzDMklXBk1qs6fhpjeZfYAuLmhOzGBZwCPqDlTCC4wYeD sX40wWBAREl5uE
    CUA6g3bzp5GtL1P5E9Km20l6sazrbOYU23yvXyDnUmQ54CC+3f Nu3SkNxXmv0/U=3D
    =3DC16d
    -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

  10. #10
    Jake Appelbaum
    Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked
    Gast
    n/a Berichten
    Berichten zijn liked



    Thread Starter

    Re: Evidence Mounts that the Vote Was Hacked


    --=-J/smD2IERoVa6B0n5gbr
    Content-Type: text/plain
    Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

    I think it's obvious something is badly when you have things like this
    in the source code of all Diebold election machines:

    #defineDESKEY((des_KEY8F2654hd4"

    Yes, that's a static shared key for all the machines.

    Source:
    http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/11/10/1172/9052

    How much more obvious does it need to be?

    --=20
    Jake Appelbaum <jacob@appelbaum.net>

    --=-J/smD2IERoVa6B0n5gbr
    Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name=signature.asc
    Content-Description: This is a digitally signed message part

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    =wNXx
    -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

    --=-J/smD2IERoVa6B0n5gbr--


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