Onderwerp: local buffer overflow in htpasswd for apache 1.3.31 not fixed in .33?

This was posted on the full-disclosure list sept 16 2004 by
Luiz Fernando.

http://archives.neohapsis.com/archiv...4-09/0547.html

The nessus check for this vulnerability recommends upgrading to
Apache version 1.3.32:

http://cgi.nessus.org/plugins/dump.php3?id=14771

But in Apache 1.3.33:

lachoy# grep strcpy /install/src/apache_1.3.33/src/support/htpasswd.c
strcpy(record, user);
strcpy(pwfilename, argv[i]);
strcpy(user, argv[i + 1]);
strcpy(password, argv[i + 2]);
strcpy(scratch, line);

It is still vulnerable.

I patched my version that seemed to thwart the exploit offered by
Luiz. Here is the diff:

root@bokchoy:~/tes/apache_1.3.33/src/support# diff -uN htpasswd.orig.c
htpasswd.c
--- htpasswd.orig.c 2004-10-28 18:20:13.000000000 -0400
+++ htpasswd.c 2004-10-28 18:17:25.000000000 -0400
@@ -202,9 +202,9 @@
ap_cpystrn(record, "resultant record too long", (rlen - 1));
return ERR_OVERFLOW;
}
- strcpy(record, user);
+ strncpy(record, user,MAX_STRING_LEN - 1);
strcat(record, ":");
- strcat(record, cpw);
+ strncat(record, cpw,MAX_STRING_LEN - 1);
return 0;
}

@@ -410,14 +410,14 @@
fprintf(stderr, "%s: filename too long\n", argv[0]);
return ERR_OVERFLOW;
}
- strcpy(pwfilename, argv[i]);
+ strncpy(pwfilename, argv[i], MAX_STRING_LEN-1);
if (strlen(argv[i + 1]) > (sizeof(user) - 1)) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: username too long (>%lu)\n", argv[0],
(unsigned long)(sizeof(user) - 1));
return ERR_OVERFLOW;
}
}
- strcpy(user, argv[i + 1]);
+ strncpy(user, argv[i + 1],MAX_STRING_LEN-1);
if ((arg = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: username contains illegal character
'%c'\n",
argv[0], *arg);
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@
(unsigned long)(sizeof(password) - 1));
return ERR_OVERFLOW;
}
- strcpy(password, argv[i + 2]);
+ strncpy(password, argv[i + 2],MAX_STRING_LEN - 1 );
}

#ifdef WIN32
@@ -553,7 +553,7 @@
putline(ftemp, line);
continue;
}
- strcpy(scratch, line);
+ strncpy(scratch, line,MAX_STRING_LEN -1);
/*
* See if this is our user.
*/


Larry W. Cashdollar
http://vapid.ath.cx

Hi list, hi Andre,

Agree wholeheartedly. We saw this as far back as 1998 and ignored it for t=
he=20
exact same reason. I bet we were not the only ones.=20

At the time It took me around half an hour to write a replacement=20
user-add/password change CGI in perl.=20

htpasswd was never intended to be run setuid or from scripts. Anyone who h=
ave=20
tried doing so without subjecting it to an audit gets whatever they deserve=
=2E=20
You have to understand what you are doing before whacking an arbitrary=20
program with the +s bit.

A.

On Friday 29 October 2004 22:53, Andr=E9 Malo wrote:
> * Larry Cashdollar <lwc@vapid.ath.cx> wrote:
> > This was posted on the full-disclosure list sept 16 2004 by
> > Luiz Fernando.
> >
> > http://archives.neohapsis.com/archiv...4-09/0547.html
> >
> > The nessus check for this vulnerability recommends upgrading to
> > Apache version 1.3.32:
> >
> > http://cgi.nessus.org/plugins/dump.php3?id=3D14771
> >
> > But in Apache 1.3.33:
> >
> > lachoy# grep strcpy /install/src/apache_1.3.33/src/support/htpasswd.c
> > strcpy(record, user);
> > strcpy(pwfilename, argv[i]);
> > strcpy(user, argv[i + 1]);
> > strcpy(password, argv[i + 2]);
> > strcpy(scratch, line);
> >
> > It is still vulnerable.
>
> If you start htpasswd from a shell and you exploit some kind of buffer
> overflow, you get ... a shell?. Wow!
>
> Whoever runs htpasswd setuid is darn silly. The httpd developers, the docs
> and commonsense tell, that the program is just not designed for such an
> intention.
>
> Or in other words, take any program that's not designed for being run
> setuid and you'll find a "vulnerability" (e.g. with malloc debug
> environment variables or the like).
>
> Sorry, I can't see a security vulnerability here.
>
> nd

* Larry Cashdollar <lwc@vapid.ath.cx> [2004-10-30 10:49]:
> This was posted on the full-disclosure list sept 16 2004 by
> Luiz Fernando.
>
> http://archives.neohapsis.com/archiv...4-09/0547.html
>
> The nessus check for this vulnerability recommends upgrading to
> Apache version 1.3.32:
>
> http://cgi.nessus.org/plugins/dump.php3?id=14771
>
> But in Apache 1.3.33:
>
> lachoy# grep strcpy /install/src/apache_1.3.33/src/support/htpasswd.c
> strcpy(record, user);
> strcpy(pwfilename, argv[i]);
> strcpy(user, argv[i + 1]);
> strcpy(password, argv[i + 2]);
> strcpy(scratch, line);
>
> It is still vulnerable.

This was fixed in OpenBSD's apache 2003/04/08, over 18 months ago.