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  1. #1
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    Corsaire Security Advisory - Multiple vendor MIME RFC2047 encoding issue
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    Corsaire Security Advisory - Multiple vendor MIME RFC2047 encoding issue


    -- Corsaire Security Advisory --

    Title: Multiple vendor MIME RFC2047 encoding issue
    Date: 04.08.03
    Application: various
    Environment: various
    Author: Martin O'Neal [martin.oneal@corsaire.com]
    Audience: General distribution
    Reference: c030804-007


    -- Scope --

    The aim of this document is to clearly define a MIME content evasion
    issue that affects a variety of products including; browsers, proxy
    servers, email clients, content security gateways and antivirus
    products.


    -- History --

    Discovered: 04.08.03 (Martin O'Neal)
    NISCC notified: 19.02.04
    Document released: 13.09.04


    -- Overview --

    There are a number of content security gateway and antivirus products
    available that provide policy based security functionality. Part of this
    functionality allows the products to block embedded file attachments
    based on their specific content type, such as executables or those
    containing viruses. However, by using malformed MIME encapsulation
    techniques centred on the presence of fields encoded using the RFC2047
    parameter value character set and language information, this
    functionality can be evaded.


    -- Analysis --

    The MIME standards are intended to provide a common mechanism to
    exchange data between systems and are used extensively by protocols such
    as HTTP and SMTP. The structure of a MIME message is defined in RFC2045
    [1], which in turn makes use of concepts introduced in RFC822 [2]
    (superseded by RFC2822 [3]).

    The standards define a range of fields that control how data is encoded
    within the transport, and how it should be interpreted by the receiving
    agent. RFC2047 [4] defines "techniques to allow the encoding of non-
    ASCII text in various portions of a RFC 822 [2] message header, in a
    manner which is unlikely to confuse existing message handling software".

    The implementation of these encoding standards has not been universal by
    all of the vendors. For many products, such as email clients and
    browsers, this scope for variation might only result in some unreliable
    behaviour. However, for a collection of security products, being unaware
    of the various ways that the standard has been implemented can lead to
    more serious results, as the products may fail to detect a threat within
    the data stream.

    When a receiving agent is presented with a MIME message that contains an
    unknown RFC2047 encoding, it tends to respond in one of two broad ways:

    - It identifies the MIME message as malformed and blocks it.
    - It fails to interpret the MIME field (or message).

    The first of the two would be the correct behaviour for a security
    conscious product, but based on empirical research this is not the
    common result for a number of scenarios.

    The RFC2047 encoding issue has been observed to affect many of the
    security products. To use this issue as an attack vector, all that is
    required is to identify a target that has a client agent that
    successfully interprets the RFC2047 encoding correctly, where any
    security products that protect it do not.


    -- Recommendations --

    To be effective tools, the security products must not only be able to
    process encoding techniques implemented as per the relevant standard,
    but also common misinterpretations and deliberate corruptions.

    As an ongoing process, a study project should be undertaken by the
    vendors to identify applications that routinely decode MIME objects and
    have a liberal interpretation of the MIME standard.

    NISCC have produced a document consolidating a number of vendor
    statements on these issues [5]. Contact your vendor directly to
    establish whether you are affected by these issues.


    -- Background --

    This issue was discovered using a custom SMTP/HTTP vulnerability
    analysis tool developed by Corsaire's security assessment team. This
    tool is not available publicly, but is an example of the specialist
    approach used by Corsaire's consultants as part of a commercial security
    assessment. To find out more about the cutting edge services provided by
    Corsaire simply visit our web site at http://www.corsaire.com


    -- CVE --

    The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned
    the name CAN-2004-0053 to this issue. This is a candidate for
    inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardises
    names for security problems.


    -- References --

    [1] http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2045.html
    [2] http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc822.html
    [3] http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2822.html
    [4] http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2047.html
    [5] http://www.uniras.gov.uk/vuls/2004/380375/mime.htm


    -- Revision --

    a. Initial release.
    b. Included CVE reference.
    c. Released.


    -- Distribution --

    This security advisory may be freely distributed, provided that it
    remains unaltered and in its original form.


    -- Disclaimer --

    The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with
    no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. Corsaire
    accepts no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of
    this information.


    -- About Corsaire --

    Corsaire are a leading information security consultancy, founded in 1997
    in Guildford, Surrey, UK. Corsaire bring innovation, integrity and
    analytical rigour to every job, which means fast and dramatic security
    performance improvements. Our services centre on the delivery of
    information security planning, assessment, implementation, management
    and vulnerability research.

    A free guide to selecting a security assessment supplier is available at
    http://www.penetration-testing.com


    Copyright 2003 Corsaire Limited. All rights reserved.




  2. #2
    Borja Marcos
    Corsaire Security Advisory - Multiple vendor MIME RFC2047 encoding issue
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    Re: Corsaire Security Advisory - Multiple vendor MIME RFC2047 encoding issue

    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
    Hash: SHA1

    > 2. Your logic sounds convincing, but interposing a proxy that
    > systematically changes incoming messages raises red flags in my mind.


    Digital signatures would not work, obviously.

    However, which is the reason to keep a malformed message? It's like
    the stupid thing antivirus software does, "cleaning" infected messages
    which have obviously *not* sent by the computer's owner. In the case of
    the Sircam virus, AV software failed catastrophically, not discarding
    thousands of messages with confidential documents sent without the
    knowledge of their owners, not to talk about the extremely useful
    notifications sent by those amazingly clever pieces of cr... errr,
    software.

    If someone builds faulty software which generates bad MIME headers,
    such messages should be treated as hostile messages and dropped.
    Period. What happened when Microsoft tried to make Windows
    "intelligent" so that an executable "wrongly" labelled with an audio
    MIME type it would be correctly "opened" (I mean, executed)?

    By trying to make poor programmers' life easier, we make our own lives
    harder. So, the only secure way to deal with a corrupt message is to
    drop it. Period.



    Borja.
    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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    iD8DBQFBStPEULpVo4XWgJ8RAiAYAKCU/iZrJdYW/j4OafV8VRwVZGKT8gCdHmhv
    AFNM8MrITjWR1d7HaXajcJo=
    =iVnR
    -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


  3. #3
    Greg A. Woods
    Corsaire Security Advisory - Multiple vendor MIME RFC2047 encoding issue
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    Re: Corsaire Security Advisory - Multiple vendor MIME RFC2047 encoding issue

    [ On Friday, September 17, 2004 at 14:08:33 (+0200), Borja Marcos wrote: ]
    > Subject: Re: Corsaire Security Advisory - Multiple vendor MIME RFC2047 encoding issue
    >
    > If someone builds faulty software which generates bad MIME headers,
    > such messages should be treated as hostile messages and dropped.
    > Period.


    You are 110% correct.

    Thank you very much for saying that, and I would suggest that at the
    current time it is something which cannot be repeated too many times.

    Far too few software developers understand the idea of "failing safely".

    Passing on "cleaned" or "de-fanged" messages is a guaranteed way of
    failing catastrophically.

    --
    Greg A. Woods

    +1 416 218-0098 VE3TCP RoboHack <woods@robohack.ca>
    Planix, Inc. <woods@planix.com> Secrets of the Weird <woods@weird.com>

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