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  1. #1
    Toomas Soome
    Re: [Full-Disclosure] Clear text password exposure in Datakey's tokens
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    Re: [Full-Disclosure] Clear text password exposure in Datakey's tokens

    Lionel Ferette wrote:

    > Note that this is true for almost all card readers on the market, not only for
    > Datakey's. Having worked for companies using crypto smart cards, I have
    > conducted a few risk analysis about that. The conclusion has always been that
    > if the PIN must be entered from a PC, and the attacker has means to install
    > software on the system (through directed viruses, social engineering, etc),
    > the game's over.
    >
    > The only solution against that problem is to have the PIN entered using a
    > keypad on the reader. Only then does the cost of an attack raise
    > significantly. But that is opening another can of worms, because there is
    > (was?) no standard for card readers with attached pin pad (at the time,
    > PC/SCv2 wasn't finalised - is it?).
    >


    at least some cards are supporting des passphrases to implement secured
    communication channels but I suppose this feature is not that widely in
    use.... how many card owners are prepared to remember both PIN codes
    and passphrases...

    toomas

  2. #2
    Lee Dilkie
    Re: [Full-Disclosure] Clear text password exposure in Datakey's tokens
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    Re: [Full-Disclosure] Clear text password exposure in Datakey's tokens

    Toomas Soome wrote:

    > Lionel Ferette wrote:
    >
    >> Note that this is true for almost all card readers on the market, not
    >> only for Datakey's. Having worked for companies using crypto smart
    >> cards, I have conducted a few risk analysis about that. The
    >> conclusion has always been that if the PIN must be entered from a PC,
    >> and the attacker has means to install software on the system (through
    >> directed viruses, social engineering, etc), the game's over.
    >>
    >> The only solution against that problem is to have the PIN entered
    >> using a keypad on the reader. Only then does the cost of an attack
    >> raise significantly. But that is opening another can of worms,
    >> because there is (was?) no standard for card readers with attached
    >> pin pad (at the time, PC/SCv2 wasn't finalised - is it?).
    >>

    >
    > at least some cards are supporting des passphrases to implement
    > secured communication channels but I suppose this feature is not that
    > widely in use.... how many card owners are prepared to remember both
    > PIN codes and passphrases...
    >
    > toomas


    Perhaps I'm missing something here. As far as I can tell, no keys
    located on the card were compromised, only the PIN was. Since this is a
    two factor authentication system, possession of the PIN is of little
    value without possession of the token itself.

    Am I missing the point here?

    regards,

    -lee

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