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  1. #1
    Andrey G. Sergeev
    RFC: content-filter and AV notifications (Was: Re: RFC: virus handling)
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    RFC: content-filter and AV notifications (Was: Re: RFC: virus handling)

    Hello!


    Wed Jan 28 2004 18:45:39 Thomas Zehetbauer <thomasz@hostmaster.org> wrote:

    TZ> Looking at the current outbreak of the Mydoom.A worm I would like
    TZ> to share and discuss some thoughts:

    [...]

    TZ> 1.) Virus Detected Notifications
    TZ> After filtering out the messages generated by the worm itself
    TZ> there remain a lot of messages generated by automated e-mail
    TZ> scanning solutions.

    TZ> 1.1.) Configuration
    TZ> Unless the virus scanner provides special handling for worms and
    TZ> virii which knowingly use a faked sender address it should not
    ^^^^^^^^^^
    MUST NOT
    TZ> send out notification messages unless the administrator has been
    TZ> warned that these notification messages may not reach the intended
    TZ> recipient and has still enabled this feature.

    Very good.

    TZ> 1.2.) Format
    TZ> These messages cannot be easily filtered because they come in many
    TZ> different formats and do often not contain any useful information
    TZ> at all.

    TZ> 1.2.1.) Standardization
    TZ> To allow filtering of these messages they should always carry the
    TZ> text 'possible virus found' in the subject optionally extended by
    TZ> the name of the virus or the test conducted (eg. heuristics).

    1.2.1.) Standardization
    To allow filtering of these messages they MUST always contain the
    header "Auto-Submitted: auto-generated (antivirus)" or (if any content
    filtering engine is in place) "Auto-Submitted: auto-generated
    (content-filter)" or (the last but not the best possible variant)
    "Auto-Submitted: auto-generated (failure)".

    The "Subject:" header SHOULD follow the generally adopted rules for
    the messages originated from various software running at the mail
    gateways (widely known as "Mail Delivery Subsystem") e.g. "Returned
    mail: see transcript for details". The suggested subjects is "Returned
    mail: possible virus found" and "Returned mail: content filter
    triggering). This subject MAY be optionally extended with the IP
    address from which the infected message has been received. The subject
    MAY also contains the name of the virus (or content filter) in
    question.

    TZ> 1.2.2.) Virus Information
    TZ> The message should
    ^^^^^^
    MUST
    TZ> always include the name of the virus found or the test conducted
    TZ> (eg. forbidden file type).

    TZ> 1.1.2.) Original Message
    TZ> The notification should never include the original message sent as
    TZ> otherwise it may send the worm/virus to a previously unaffected
    TZ> third party or re-infect a system that has already been cleaned.

    1.1.2.) Original Message
    The notification MUST never include the original message body and
    attachment(s) (if any) sent as otherwise it may send the worm/virus to
    a previously unaffected third party or re-infect a system that has
    already been cleaned. The header of the original message MUST be
    included in the notification's body to allow the further analysis by
    the system administrators and advanced users (i.e. responsible
    persons). However the original message body SHOULD be accessible by
    these and only these responsible persons via some Web-interface,
    queries to postmaster of the sending domain or direct access to the
    mail server quarantine directory.

    TZ> 1.2.) Notification
    TZ> Regarding wasted time and storage capacity the false notifications
    TZ> sent out to innocent third parties by many systems are already
    TZ> causing more damage than the actual worm or virus. Given the
    TZ> current situation of many unaware or ignorant administrators
    TZ> everyone capable to do so should tell these people to fix their
    TZ> badly configured e-mail scanners.

    TZ> 2.) Non Delivery Notifications
    TZ> It seems that this worm is trying to avoid people getting
    TZ> treacherous non delivery notifications by using obviously faked
    TZ> but otherwise plausible e-mail addresses. This may cause double
    TZ> bounce messages or even message loops at badly configured sites.

    TZ> 2.1.) Avoid
    TZ> Virus filters should
    ^^^^^^
    MUST
    TZ> therefore be designed and implemented before checking the
    TZ> legitimacy of the intended recipient. This would also avoid
    TZ> helping the virus spread by bouncing it to a previously unaffected
    TZ> third party.

    TZ> 3.) ISPs
    TZ> It is worth to note that once again primarily individuals using a
    TZ> commercial provider have been affected by this worm.

    TZ> 3.1.) Notification
    TZ> As these people do mostly not run a SMTP server on their system it
    TZ> is unfortunately almost impossible to contact them when only
    TZ> knowing their IP address.

    TZ> 3.1.1.) Abuse Role Account
    TZ> Providers should provide an adequately stuffed abuse role account
    TZ> to allow the affected users beeing notified. To ease efficiency
    TZ> messages sent there should include the IP address, the exact time
    TZ> and date of the incident and the name of the virus on the subject
    TZ> line.

    TZ> 3.1.2.) e-mail Alias and Web-Interface
    TZ> Additionally providers should provide e-mail aliases for the IP
    TZ> addresses of their customers (eg. customer at 127.0.0.1 can be
    TZ> reached via 127.0.0.1@provider.com) or a web interface with
    TZ> similiar functionality. The latter should be provided when
    TZ> dynamically assigned IP addresses are used for which an additional
    TZ> timestamp is required.

    TZ> 3.2.) Disconnect
    TZ> Providers should grant their customers some grace period to clean
    TZ> their infection and should thereafter be disconnected entirely or
    TZ> filtered based on protocol (eg. outgoing SMTP) or content (eg.
    TZ> transparent smarthost with virus scanner) until they testify that
    TZ> they have cleaned their system.


    --

    Yours sincerely,

    Andrey G. Sergeev (AKA Andris) http://www.andris.msk.ru/


  2. #2
    Peter J. Holzer
    RFC: content-filter and AV notifications (Was: Re: RFC: virus handling)
    Gast
    n/a Berichten
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    Thread Starter

    Re: RFC: content-filter and AV notifications (Was: Re: RFC: virus handling)

    --K/NRh952CO+2tg14
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    On 2004-01-29 15:00:03 +0300, Andrey G. Sergeev (AKA Andris) wrote:
    > Wed Jan 28 2004 18:45:39 Thomas Zehetbauer <thomasz@hostmaster.org> wrote:
    >=20
    > TZ> 2.1.) Avoid
    > TZ> Virus filters should
    > ^^^^^^
    > MUST
    > TZ> therefore be designed and implemented before checking the
    > TZ> legitimacy of the intended recipient. This would also avoid
    > TZ> helping the virus spread by bouncing it to a previously unaffected
    > TZ> third party.


    This is a not a good idea. In SMTP, the recipient(s) are transmitted
    before the content of the mail. Each RCPT command (specifying one
    recipient) can succeed or fail. Checking the legitimacy of recipients
    should happen at this stage: Firstly, if no valid recipients are found,
    the message doesn't even have to be transmitted. Secondly, at this stage
    you can reject the mail for some recipients, but not for others. At the
    DATA stage you can only summarily accept or reject it. Thirdly, if you
    accept the mail, you have taken over responsibility for it. If you later
    decide you cannot deliver the mail, you must generate a DSN. But at that
    point you cannot know whether the return path is valid, so you may send
    DSNs to innocent third parties.=20

    If at all possible avoid accepting a mail that you are not sure you will
    deliver! Try to do all checks during the SMTP conversion so that you can
    reject the mail instead of bouncing it (which will often avoid the
    bounce completely, since the SMTP engines used by spammers and worms
    don't generate bounces), and do it as early as possible to keep traffic
    down.

    hp

    --=20
    _ | Peter J. Holzer | Shooting the users in the foot is bad.=20
    |_|_) | Sysadmin WSR / LUGA | Giving them a gun isn't.
    | | | hjp@wsr.ac.at | -- Gordon Schumacher,
    __/ | http://www.hjp.at/ | mozilla bug #84128

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