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  1. #31
    der Mouse
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    Re: vulnerabilities of postscript printers

    > Good morning, der Mouse,

    > Hope I address you correctly. .o)


    It will do . I usually drop the "der" in connected writing, where a
    name is called for (as here and below).

    > a) Those implementation-specific operators can be used by a malicious
    > program as well - the only barrier between the jobs is the
    > environment setup by the job-monitor (and protected against overwrite
    > by the 32 bit integer "password").


    Not necessarily; the operators in question may be in a separate
    dictionary of their own, or they may not have names in any dictionary.

    Of course, if they _are_ accessible and _do_ work, then there is a
    potential problem, yes.

    > b) Chances are, that the printer develeoper have not invented the
    > wheel from scratch but simply bought an Adobe Interpreter [...]


    Yes. The monoculture argument. Do you have reason to think the Adobe
    interpreter suffers from this problem?

    >> Well, data-stealing does necessarily involve sending the data
    >> somewhere unexpected. This means writing to somewhere more or less
    >> arbitrary.

    > Or polling the printer which special "print"-jobs which do not print
    > anything at all and can run without notice (except perhaps for some
    > data-transmission led blinking).


    Yes - but there is not a whole lot of data storage available on most
    printers, so you have to know fairly exactly what you're looking for.
    (Which of course you sometimes may.)

    >> If a printer resets its password to 0 on powerup, yes, that would be
    >> a severe vulnerability. [...]

    > Yes, [...] [p]robably pushing a little switch on the backside or
    > inserting a paper clip into a small hole to initialize the printer to
    > factory defaults might be needed.


    Yes. And that (a) requires physical access (which admittedly is not
    always implausible) and (b) will reset a lot of other values, such as
    IP address and default language, and hence is going to be difficult to
    do without being noticed, even on an acessible printer.

    > The first level would be to install my personal "layer" above the
    > interesting operators (including the implementation dependend ones).
    > That way I could augment or circumvent or even replace the inbuild
    > job-handling with my own version.


    Yes...assuming the main loop _is_ written in PostScript. Assuming that
    all the necessary operators have accessible names in some accessible
    dictionary. Assuming that the operators in question don't mind being
    called from within a job context (it wouldn't surprise me if they did
    check, and (say) reset the CPU in that case, on the theory that
    indicates a bug).

    That's a lot of assumptions. Now, it may be that they are all valid
    assumptions for some printers. Do you have reason to think there are
    any such? So far I've seen nothing but speculation, and that's
    certainly all I have on this point. If those assumptions are valid, I
    would call it a fairly serious bug, because of exactly this threat.

    As for opening up my own printer to you...I'll address that off-list.

    /~\ The ASCII der Mouse
    \ / Ribbon Campaign
    X Against HTML mouse@rodents.montreal.qc.ca
    / \ Email! 7D C8 61 52 5D E7 2D 39 4E F1 31 3E E8 B3 27 4B

  2. #32
    Bob Beck
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    Re: vulnerabilities of postscript printers


    >>> My god, people attach printers to networks! Postscript is Turing Complete!

    >> Blah blah - you can't open files...

    > Sure you can, RTFM...


    Who cares? if it's a network attached printer there's some sort of
    IP stack in there speaking lpr, and some semblance of an operating
    system. It's a computer. It has network interfaces, the software is
    certainly full of bugs and sucks, like most other software. It's
    probably exploitable. Why would you treat this device any differently
    than any other network attachable device on your secured network?

    Either you allow devices to have connections to both secured and
    unsecured networks or you don't. If you think a printer, refrigerator,
    jet-direct device, set-top-box, 802.11? stuff, coffee machine, coke
    machine, Cell phone, PDA, etc. etc. could never be exploited to talk to
    whatever it's talking to, please call me, I have a great opportunity
    with a moose milking ranch to get you in on early.

    -Bob

  3. #33
    Bob Beck
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    Thread Starter

    Re: vulnerabilities of postscript printers


    >>> My god, people attach printers to networks! Postscript is Turing Complete!

    >> Blah blah - you can't open files...

    > Sure you can, RTFM...


    Who cares? if it's a network attached printer there's some sort of
    IP stack in there speaking lpr, and some semblance of an operating
    system. It's a computer. It has network interfaces, the software is
    certainly full of bugs and sucks, like most other software. It's
    probably exploitable. Why would you treat this device any differently
    than any other network attachable device on your secured network?

    Either you allow devices to have connections to both secured and
    unsecured networks or you don't. If you think a printer, refrigerator,
    jet-direct device, set-top-box, 802.11? stuff, coffee machine, coke
    machine, Cell phone, PDA, etc. etc. could never be exploited to talk to
    whatever it's talking to, please call me, I have a great opportunity
    with a moose milking ranch to get you in on early.

    -Bob

  4. #34
    Theo de Raadt
    vulnerabilities of postscript printers
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    Thread Starter

    Re: vulnerabilities of postscript printers

    > >>> My god, people attach printers to networks! Postscript is Turing Complete!
    > >> Blah blah - you can't open files...

    > > Sure you can, RTFM...

    >
    > Who cares? if it's a network attached printer there's some sort of
    > IP stack in there speaking lpr, and some semblance of an operating
    > system. It's a computer. It has network interfaces, the software is
    > certainly full of bugs and sucks, like most other software. It's
    > probably exploitable. Why would you treat this device any differently
    > than any other network attachable device on your secured network?


    I concur.

    When is the entire security community going to start realizing that

    - statistics keep showing there is approximately 1 bug in ever
    50-200 lines of code

    - these bugs fall into classes of "programmer error", like
    heap object overflow, stack object overflow, range check
    failure, input mismanagement, race, ...

    - for certain classes, nearly EVERY occurance is exploitable,
    for instance, nearly all stack object overflows are exploitable

    - I am going to estimate that a typical postscript rom is, what,
    2MB of code, probably is generated from about 100,000 lines of
    code.. are we getting the picture?

    Hence, I assume that if something has not been specifically audited by
    a person who is allowed to and capable of "cleaning the code to make
    it paranoid" as they audit, that code will have bugs.

    What stuns me is that someone would even need to ask the question of
    "is a postscript printer secure", and that numerous people would get
    lost in the rats nest of discussing what the postscript langauge is
    capable of. I would bet that most of the security holes in a printer
    would be due to crappy low level bugs.

    If I can't read the code to confirm that it is crap, I assume that it
    is crap.

    And I bet there are people actively exploiting printer firmware..

  5. #35
    Theo de Raadt
    vulnerabilities of postscript printers
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    Thread Starter

    Re: vulnerabilities of postscript printers

    > >>> My god, people attach printers to networks! Postscript is Turing Complete!
    > >> Blah blah - you can't open files...

    > > Sure you can, RTFM...

    >
    > Who cares? if it's a network attached printer there's some sort of
    > IP stack in there speaking lpr, and some semblance of an operating
    > system. It's a computer. It has network interfaces, the software is
    > certainly full of bugs and sucks, like most other software. It's
    > probably exploitable. Why would you treat this device any differently
    > than any other network attachable device on your secured network?


    I concur.

    When is the entire security community going to start realizing that

    - statistics keep showing there is approximately 1 bug in ever
    50-200 lines of code

    - these bugs fall into classes of "programmer error", like
    heap object overflow, stack object overflow, range check
    failure, input mismanagement, race, ...

    - for certain classes, nearly EVERY occurance is exploitable,
    for instance, nearly all stack object overflows are exploitable

    - I am going to estimate that a typical postscript rom is, what,
    2MB of code, probably is generated from about 100,000 lines of
    code.. are we getting the picture?

    Hence, I assume that if something has not been specifically audited by
    a person who is allowed to and capable of "cleaning the code to make
    it paranoid" as they audit, that code will have bugs.

    What stuns me is that someone would even need to ask the question of
    "is a postscript printer secure", and that numerous people would get
    lost in the rats nest of discussing what the postscript langauge is
    capable of. I would bet that most of the security holes in a printer
    would be due to crappy low level bugs.

    If I can't read the code to confirm that it is crap, I assume that it
    is crap.

    And I bet there are people actively exploiting printer firmware..

  6. #36
    Georg Lutz
    vulnerabilities of postscript printers
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    Thread Starter

    Re: vulnerabilities of postscript printers

    On 2004-01-24, Glynn Clements wrote:
    > PostScript has the ability to read/write named files, and nothing
    > prohibits an implementation from making peripheral devices or ports
    > accessible as named files. E.g. using GhostScript on Linux, the
    > following trivial PostScript program sends a WAV file (or the first
    > 20kb thereof) to the sound card:
    >
    > (/dev/dsp) (w) file dup
    > (foo.wav) (r) file
    > 20000 string readstring pop
    > writestring flushfile
    >
    > [The -dSAFER switch disables file access, and should be used when
    > running gs on "untrusted" PostScript files.]
    >


    Does this mean, that a Postscript-file is not safer than a MS Word
    document?

    Shouldnt -dSAFER be then the default option? Or breaks this something
    else?

    --
    Georg

  7. #37
    Dragos Ruiu
    vulnerabilities of postscript printers
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    Thread Starter

    Re: vulnerabilities of postscript printers

    On January 24, 2004 01:32 pm, Theo de Raadt wrote:
    > And I bet there are people actively exploiting printer firmware..


    /me points to FX's work at phenoelit.de

    I still like his "please insert 25c" message on the LCD panel.
    Network attached printers are good portscanners in practice :-).

    cheers,
    --dr

    --
    Top security experts. Cutting edge tools, techniques and information.
    Vancouver, Canada April 21-23 2004 http://cansecwest.com
    pgpkey http://dragos.com/ kyxpgp

  8. #38
    Nicolas Gregoire
    vulnerabilities of postscript printers
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    Thread Starter

    Re: vulnerabilities of postscript printers

    On Fri, 2004-01-30 at 10:15, Dragos Ruiu wrote:

    > Network attached printers are good portscanners in practice :-).


    And their poor IP stacks are easy to use for Idle scans, allowing to
    hide the real source of packets.

    And you could too keep your sploits on their hard-drive, which could be
    the only one of the network without an AV monitoring it.

    --
    Nicolas Gregoire ----- Consultant en Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information
    ngregoire@exaprobe.com ------[ ExaProbe ]------ http://www.exaprobe.com/
    PGP KeyID:CA61B44F FingerPrint:1CC647FF1A55664BA2D2AFDACA6A21DACA61B4 4F


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