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  1. #1
    Seth Fogie
    White Wolf Labs #080922-1: Exploitation Through ActiveSync 4.x
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    Thread Starter

    White Wolf Labs #080922-1: Exploitation Through ActiveSync 4.x

    White Wolf Labs #080922-1: Exploitation Through ActiveSync 4.x

    Product: ActiveSync 4.x

    Platform: NA

    Requirements: NA

    Credits:

    Seth Fogie
    White Wolf Security
    http://www.whitewolfsecurity.com
    August 21, 2008

    Risk Level:

    Medium - Full TCP/IP access via RNDIS protocol over USB from
    Windows Mobile device.

    Summary:

    With the introduction of ActiveSync 4.x, Microsoft significantly
    altered how the Windows Mobile device communicates with the host PC.
    Specifically, ActiveSync 4.x implements RNDIS to facilitate the
    transmission of data between the Windows Mobile device and the host PC.
    The result is that a connected Windows Mobile device will have full
    TCP/IP access to the host PC over USB - regardless of whether or not the
    system is logged in or if the device is fully synced.

    Details:

    ActiveSync 4.x is the primary method by which users sync their
    Windows Mobile devices to their PC. In order to create a fast and stable
    syncing process, Microsoft incorporated RNDIS into ActiveSync, which
    requires a full TCP/IP connection between the mobile device and the host
    PC before any syncing related data is passed. Since the ability to pass
    TCP/IP over USB is driver level, it happens the moment a Windows Mobile
    device is connected to a PC with ActiveSync installed. And since
    ActiveSync is executed during startup, it is always running - even if
    the system is locked.

    As a result, a Windows Mobile device can be plugged into a USB
    port, from which an attack can be launched. In addition, if the device
    has never been synced to the host PC, any wireless card will remain
    enabled. As a result, an attacker can connect a device into a PC's USB
    port, hide it nearby, establish a wireless connection and remotely
    control the device.

    An example attack scenario is as follows: connect USB device,
    perform port scan with vxUtil, locate open ports, determine potential
    vulnerabilities based on open ports, prepare exploit code, setup netcat
    listener on remote host or on the Windows Mobile device itself (Netcat
    for CE), attempt to exploit system. If the target host is vulnerable to
    a particular attack, exploit code will be executed. This scenario is
    demonstrated in video using a DCOM exploit (ms03-026) from a Windows
    Mobile device to get a reverse-shell back to the mobile device. PoC
    includes DCOM exploit to illustrate the effectiveness of this attack vector.

    More details are located at:
    http://www.informit.com/guides/conte...ity&seqNum=326

    PoC, video, and links to component of attack are located at:
    http://www.whitewolfsecurity.com/security/080922-1.php

    Workaround: Disable the USB syncing option in the settings and only
    enable when needed.

    Vendor Response: Vendor was notified.

    Copyright 2008 White Wolf Security

    Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
    electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express
    written consent of White Wolf Security. If you wish to reprint the
    whole, or any part, of this alert in any other medium other than
    electronically, please contact White Wolf Security for permission.

    Disclaimer: The information in this advisory is believed to be accurate
    at the time of publishing, based on currently available information. Use
    of the information constitutes acceptance for use on an AS IS condition.
    There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
    author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect,
    or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on,
    this information.


  2. #2
    Vladimir '3APA3A' Dubrovin
    White Wolf Labs #080922-1: Exploitation Through ActiveSync 4.x
    Gast
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    Berichten zijn liked



    Thread Starter

    Re: White Wolf Labs #080922-1: Exploitation Through ActiveSync 4.x

    Dear Seth Fogie,

    In a same way you can plug an USB Ethernet network adapter with
    notebook attached. No active sync required at all. This is a question
    of physical security.

    --Tuesday, September 30, 2008, 6:08:05 PM, you wrote to bugtraq@securityfocus.com:

    SF> White Wolf Labs #080922-1: Exploitation Through ActiveSync 4.x

    SF> Product: ActiveSync 4.x

    SF> Platform: NA

    SF> Requirements: NA

    SF> Credits:

    SF> Seth Fogie
    SF> White Wolf Security
    SF> http://www.whitewolfsecurity.com
    SF> August 21, 2008

    SF> Risk Level:

    SF> Medium - Full TCP/IP access via RNDIS protocol over USB from
    SF> Windows Mobile device.

    SF> Summary:

    SF> With the introduction of ActiveSync 4.x, Microsoft significantly
    SF> altered how the Windows Mobile device communicates with the host PC.
    SF> Specifically, ActiveSync 4.x implements RNDIS to facilitate the
    SF> transmission of data between the Windows Mobile device and the host PC.
    SF> The result is that a connected Windows Mobile device will have full
    SF> TCP/IP access to the host PC over USB - regardless of whether or not the
    SF> system is logged in or if the device is fully synced.

    SF> Details:

    SF> ActiveSync 4.x is the primary method by which users sync their
    SF> Windows Mobile devices to their PC. In order to create a fast and stable
    SF> syncing process, Microsoft incorporated RNDIS into ActiveSync, which
    SF> requires a full TCP/IP connection between the mobile device and the host
    SF> PC before any syncing related data is passed. Since the ability to pass
    SF> TCP/IP over USB is driver level, it happens the moment a Windows Mobile
    SF> device is connected to a PC with ActiveSync installed. And since
    SF> ActiveSync is executed during startup, it is always running - even if
    SF> the system is locked.

    SF> As a result, a Windows Mobile device can be plugged into a USB
    SF> port, from which an attack can be launched. In addition, if the device
    SF> has never been synced to the host PC, any wireless card will remain
    SF> enabled. As a result, an attacker can connect a device into a PC's USB
    SF> port, hide it nearby, establish a wireless connection and remotely
    SF> control the device.

    SF> An example attack scenario is as follows: connect USB device,
    SF> perform port scan with vxUtil, locate open ports, determine potential
    SF> vulnerabilities based on open ports, prepare exploit code, setup netcat
    SF> listener on remote host or on the Windows Mobile device itself (Netcat
    SF> for CE), attempt to exploit system. If the target host is vulnerable to
    SF> a particular attack, exploit code will be executed. This scenario is
    SF> demonstrated in video using a DCOM exploit (ms03-026) from a Windows
    SF> Mobile device to get a reverse-shell back to the mobile device. PoC
    SF> includes DCOM exploit to illustrate the effectiveness of this attack vector.

    SF> More details are located at:
    SF> http://www.informit.com/guides/conte...ity&seqNum=326

    SF> PoC, video, and links to component of attack are located at:
    SF> http://www.whitewolfsecurity.com/security/080922-1.php

    SF> Workaround: Disable the USB syncing option in the settings and only
    SF> enable when needed.

    SF> Vendor Response: Vendor was notified.

    SF> Copyright 2008 White Wolf Security

    SF> Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
    SF> electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express
    SF> written consent of White Wolf Security. If you wish to reprint the
    SF> whole, or any part, of this alert in any other medium other than
    SF> electronically, please contact White Wolf Security for permission.

    SF> Disclaimer: The information in this advisory is believed to be accurate
    SF> at the time of publishing, based on currently available information. Use
    SF> of the information constitutes acceptance for use on an AS IS condition.
    SF> There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
    SF> author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect,
    SF> or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on,
    SF> this information.





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    ~/ZARAZA http://securityvulns.com/
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