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Bekijk Volledige Versie : Comcast(tm) Email Manager allows arbitrary java and activex code execution



Michael Scheidell
23/07/04, 01:25
Vulnerability in Comcast Webmail Manager allows arbitrary java and =
activex code execution=20
Systems: Comcast Webmail email system. www.comcast.net
Vulnerable: X-Mailer: AT&T Message Center Version 1 (Mar 22 2004)
Not Vulnerable: Unknown
Severity: Serious / Low (Fixed now)
Category: Arbitrary Execution of Code of Hackers Choice=20
Classification: Input Validation Error=20
BugTraq-ID: TBA=20
CVE-Number: TBA
Remote Exploit: yes=20
Local Exploit: no=20
Vendor URL: www.comcast.net
Author: Michael S. Scheidell, SECNAP Network Security=20
Original Release date: April 7, 2004
Notifications: Comcast notified April 7, 2004
Public Release date: July 22, 2004

Discussion: from www.comcast.com
High-Speed Internet. This is the fastest way to travel the Web! It's =
cable-powered, so it's always connected and you won't tie up your phone =
lines. It's a faster, more powerful and more convenient Internet =
experience.

Note: This is not so much a warning to Comcast or their users, since =
Comcast has fixed this problem, but more of a warning to every developer =
or CSIO to make sure that web based email, blogs, information, memos =
must check their code to make sure it is safe. See additional =
notifications of similar problems with GoldMine(tm) =
http://www.secnap.com/security/gm001.html, and sprintmail picture mail =
at http://www.secnap.com/security/030711.html

Problem: There was a potential for hackers to use this vulnerability to =
specially craft emails that will run random code of their choice on =
users' computers - including remote Trojans, irc zombies, spyware, =
malware, and remote key loggers. This program would run inside the =
corporate network, behind the firewall and access anything the infected =
user has access to.=20

The Comcast Webmail did not run the html email in the 'security zone' as =
does Microsoft(tm) Outlook, but passed anything that looks like HTML to =
be executed unrestricted directly to the default Browser (usually IE). =
Linux/or Unix users with Netscape may have the javascript, page =
redirection and popup email run, however, the activeX component will not =
run.=20

Comcast users have the option of using Comcast Webmail or Outlook =
Express. Because of the inability to disable html/java/or active-x in =
Comcast Webmail, those using Webmail had an increased chance of their =
computers' becoming infected in the event of a potential hacker either =
a) referencing active-x controls or b) including javascript within an =
HTML e-mail message.

The above has been tested on a Windows(tm) 2000 system with service pack =
4, all Internet Explorer patches and default (factory) Internet zone =
security settings. Also tested were two Windows XP(tm) systems with =
service pack 1 and all patches as well as Netscape 7.1 on Linux.

The security community first became aware of the potential for this kind =
of threat about two years ago. Software companies that produce =
Web-based email, blog or input system must check for arbitrary java and =
html code. Note: the original Web Mail system was written by AT&T and =
was inherited by Comcast during their purchase of AT&T's broadband =
business.

Exploit: No exploit is necessary, as there are already examples in =
viruses and trojans that were designed to attack Microsoft Outlook and =
Outlook Express.=20

Microsoft fixed these by patching both readers and allowing the user to =
set the security zone for reading HTML email in the 'insecure' settings.

To see an exhaustive list of what can happen when email is passed to IE, =
see <http://www.guninski.com/browsers.html>=20

Vendor Response: April 7, 2004. A Comcast representative called our =
office immediately. Comcast worked quickly on fixing this bug and =
rolling it out to their servers, with a solution in place by April 13, =
2004. Release of this notification was held back waiting for Comcast to =
decide how and when to self-release.

Solution:=20
Comcast is now filtering out various forms of scripting.

Credit:=20
Michael Scheidell, SECNAP Network Security, www.secnap.com
The original problem with IIE, Microsoft Outlook and Outlook Express was =
found by George Grunski and involved insecure default reading of a =
malformed HTML in Outlook and OE and insecure running of HTML (see =
<http://www.guninski.com/browsers.html>) And thanks to Johannes B. =
Ullrich, CTO SANS Internet Storm Center for assistance.

Original copy of this report can be found here=20
<http://www.secnap.com/security/20040406.html>

Copyright:=20
Above Copyright(c) 2004, SECNAP Network Security Corporation. World =
rights reserved.=20

This security report can be copied and redistributed electronically =
provided it is not edited and is quoted in its entirety without written =
consent of SECNAP Network Security Corporation. Additional information =
or permission may be obtained by contacting SECNAP Network Security at =
561-999-5000