OpenPKG
20/03/03, 22:50
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
__________________________________________________ ______________________
OpenPKG Security Advisory The OpenPKG Project
http://www.openpkg.org/security.html http://www.openpkg.org
openpkg-security@openpkg.org openpkg@openpkg.org
OpenPKG-SA-2003.026 20-Mar-2003
__________________________________________________ ______________________
Package: openssl
Vulnerability: information leakage
OpenPKG Specific: no
Affected Releases: Affected Packages: Corrected Packages:
OpenPKG CURRENT <= openssl-0.9.7a-20030317 >= openssl-0.9.7a-20030320
OpenPKG 1.2 <= openssl-0.9.7-1.2.2 >= openssl-0.9.7-1.2.3
OpenPKG 1.1 <= openssl-0.9.6g-1.1.2 >= openssl-0.9.6g-1.1.3
Affected Releases: Dependent Packages:
OpenPKG CURRENT apache cadaver cpu curl dsniff easysoap ethereal
exim fetchmail imap imapd inn linc links lynx mico
mixmaster mozilla mutt nail neon openldap openvpn
perl-ssl postfix postgresql qpopper samba sendmail
siege sio sitecopy socat stunnel subversion sysmon
w3m wget
OpenPKG 1.2 apache cpu curl ethereal fetchmail imap inn
links lynx mico mutt nail neon openldap perl-ssl
postfix postgresql qpopper samba sendmail siege
sitecopy socat stunnel sysmon w3m wget
OpenPKG 1.1 apache curl fetchmail inn links lynx mutt neon
openldap perl-ssl postfix postgresql qpopper samba
siege sitecopy socat stunnel sysmon w3m
Description:
According to an OpenSSL [0] security advisory [1], Czech cryptologists
Vlastimil Klima, Ondrej Pokorny, and Tomas Rosa have come up with an
extension of the "Bleichenbacher attack" on RSA with PKCS #1 v1.5
padding as used in SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0. The attack was documented
in their report "Attacking RSA-based Sessions in SSL/TLS" [2]. The
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id
CAN-2003-0147 [3] to the problem.
Their attack requires the attacker to open millions of SSL/TLS
connections to the server under attack. The server's behaviour when
faced with specially made-up RSA ciphertexts can reveal information
that in effect allows the attacker to perform a single RSA private key
operation on a ciphertext of its choice using the server's RSA key.
Note that the server's RSA key is not compromised in this attack.
Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm -q
openssl". If you have the "openssl" package installed and its version
is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade it
(see Solution) and it's dependent packages (see above), if any, too.
[4][5]
Solution:
Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
[6][7], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [8][9] or a mirror
location, verify its integrity [10], build a corresponding binary RPM
from it [4] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the binary
RPM [5]. For the current release OpenPKG 1.2, perform the following
operations to permanently fix the security problem (for other releases
adjust accordingly).
$ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
ftp> bin
ftp> cd release/1.2/UPD
ftp> get openssl-0.9.7-1.2.3.src.rpm
ftp> bye
$ <prefix>/bin/rpm -v --checksig openssl-0.9.7-1.2.3.src.rpm
$ <prefix>/bin/rpm --rebuild openssl-0.9.7-1.2.3.src.rpm
$ su -
# <prefix>/bin/rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/openssl-0.9.7-1.2.3.*.rpm
Additionally, you have to rebuild and reinstall all dependent
packages (see above), too. [4][5]
__________________________________________________ ______________________
References:
[0] http://www.openssl.org/
[1] http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20030319.txt
[2] http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/
[3] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0131
[4] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
[5] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary
[6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.1/UPD/openssl-0.9.6g-1.1.3.src.rpm
[7] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/openssl-0.9.7-1.2.3.src.rpm
[8] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.1/UPD/
[9] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/
[10] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
__________________________________________________ ______________________
For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with
the OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <openpkg@openpkg.org>" (ID 63C4CB9F)
of the OpenPKG project which you can find under the official URL
http://www.openpkg.org/openpkg.pgp or on http://keyserver.pgp.com/. To
check the integrity of this advisory, verify its digital signature by
using GnuPG (http://www.gnupg.org/). For instance, pipe this message to
the command "gpg --verify --keyserver keyserver.pgp.com".
__________________________________________________ ______________________
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Hash: SHA1
__________________________________________________ ______________________
OpenPKG Security Advisory The OpenPKG Project
http://www.openpkg.org/security.html http://www.openpkg.org
openpkg-security@openpkg.org openpkg@openpkg.org
OpenPKG-SA-2003.026 20-Mar-2003
__________________________________________________ ______________________
Package: openssl
Vulnerability: information leakage
OpenPKG Specific: no
Affected Releases: Affected Packages: Corrected Packages:
OpenPKG CURRENT <= openssl-0.9.7a-20030317 >= openssl-0.9.7a-20030320
OpenPKG 1.2 <= openssl-0.9.7-1.2.2 >= openssl-0.9.7-1.2.3
OpenPKG 1.1 <= openssl-0.9.6g-1.1.2 >= openssl-0.9.6g-1.1.3
Affected Releases: Dependent Packages:
OpenPKG CURRENT apache cadaver cpu curl dsniff easysoap ethereal
exim fetchmail imap imapd inn linc links lynx mico
mixmaster mozilla mutt nail neon openldap openvpn
perl-ssl postfix postgresql qpopper samba sendmail
siege sio sitecopy socat stunnel subversion sysmon
w3m wget
OpenPKG 1.2 apache cpu curl ethereal fetchmail imap inn
links lynx mico mutt nail neon openldap perl-ssl
postfix postgresql qpopper samba sendmail siege
sitecopy socat stunnel sysmon w3m wget
OpenPKG 1.1 apache curl fetchmail inn links lynx mutt neon
openldap perl-ssl postfix postgresql qpopper samba
siege sitecopy socat stunnel sysmon w3m
Description:
According to an OpenSSL [0] security advisory [1], Czech cryptologists
Vlastimil Klima, Ondrej Pokorny, and Tomas Rosa have come up with an
extension of the "Bleichenbacher attack" on RSA with PKCS #1 v1.5
padding as used in SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0. The attack was documented
in their report "Attacking RSA-based Sessions in SSL/TLS" [2]. The
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id
CAN-2003-0147 [3] to the problem.
Their attack requires the attacker to open millions of SSL/TLS
connections to the server under attack. The server's behaviour when
faced with specially made-up RSA ciphertexts can reveal information
that in effect allows the attacker to perform a single RSA private key
operation on a ciphertext of its choice using the server's RSA key.
Note that the server's RSA key is not compromised in this attack.
Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm -q
openssl". If you have the "openssl" package installed and its version
is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade it
(see Solution) and it's dependent packages (see above), if any, too.
[4][5]
Solution:
Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
[6][7], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [8][9] or a mirror
location, verify its integrity [10], build a corresponding binary RPM
from it [4] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the binary
RPM [5]. For the current release OpenPKG 1.2, perform the following
operations to permanently fix the security problem (for other releases
adjust accordingly).
$ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
ftp> bin
ftp> cd release/1.2/UPD
ftp> get openssl-0.9.7-1.2.3.src.rpm
ftp> bye
$ <prefix>/bin/rpm -v --checksig openssl-0.9.7-1.2.3.src.rpm
$ <prefix>/bin/rpm --rebuild openssl-0.9.7-1.2.3.src.rpm
$ su -
# <prefix>/bin/rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/openssl-0.9.7-1.2.3.*.rpm
Additionally, you have to rebuild and reinstall all dependent
packages (see above), too. [4][5]
__________________________________________________ ______________________
References:
[0] http://www.openssl.org/
[1] http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20030319.txt
[2] http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/
[3] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0131
[4] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
[5] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary
[6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.1/UPD/openssl-0.9.6g-1.1.3.src.rpm
[7] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/openssl-0.9.7-1.2.3.src.rpm
[8] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.1/UPD/
[9] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/
[10] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
__________________________________________________ ______________________
For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with
the OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <openpkg@openpkg.org>" (ID 63C4CB9F)
of the OpenPKG project which you can find under the official URL
http://www.openpkg.org/openpkg.pgp or on http://keyserver.pgp.com/. To
check the integrity of this advisory, verify its digital signature by
using GnuPG (http://www.gnupg.org/). For instance, pipe this message to
the command "gpg --verify --keyserver keyserver.pgp.com".
__________________________________________________ ______________________
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