bzhbfzj3001@sneakemail.com
30/01/07, 20:55
This message is in MIME format. The first part should be readable text,
while the remaining parts are likely unreadable without MIME-aware tools.
---1685904357-765901060-1170175960=:2924
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=iso-8859-1; FORMAT=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: QUOTED-PRINTABLE
Content-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.62.0701301752581.2924@blib.eesi.tue.nl>
On Mon, 29 Jan 2007, [UTF-8] Micha? Melewski wrote:
> Dnia 29-01-2007, pon o godzinie 14:11 +0100, bzhbfzj3001@sneakemail.com
> napisa=FF=FF(a):
> [...]
>> Unfortunately your advisory is once again, fake. The variable you are
>> referring to is set in interface/globals.php which is of course included
>> before the mentioned include statement.
>>
> Hmm, it isn't fake - i was able to exploit this bug.
> This software (i mean openemr) i so badly written that i have been able
> to find few other bugs, like:
> """
Argh, you're right. The problematic code is here:
interface/globals.php:
....
// required for normal operation because of recent changes in PHP:
$ps =3D strpos($_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'],"myadmin");
if ($ps =3D=3D=3D false) {
extract($_GET);
extract($_POST);
}
// turn off PHP compatibility warnings
ini_set("session.bug_compat_warn","off");
?>
In other words: Turn off all those pesky security improvements, so that we=
=20
may grasp defeat from the jaws of victory. Obviously the number of people=
=20
that are running with the retarded allow_url_fopen setting on should be=20
low but looking at the quality of this software I don't think finding=20
vulnerabilities that can be exploited in real-life installations should be=
=20
hard.
Tinus=
---1685904357-765901060-1170175960=:2924--
while the remaining parts are likely unreadable without MIME-aware tools.
---1685904357-765901060-1170175960=:2924
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=iso-8859-1; FORMAT=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: QUOTED-PRINTABLE
Content-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.62.0701301752581.2924@blib.eesi.tue.nl>
On Mon, 29 Jan 2007, [UTF-8] Micha? Melewski wrote:
> Dnia 29-01-2007, pon o godzinie 14:11 +0100, bzhbfzj3001@sneakemail.com
> napisa=FF=FF(a):
> [...]
>> Unfortunately your advisory is once again, fake. The variable you are
>> referring to is set in interface/globals.php which is of course included
>> before the mentioned include statement.
>>
> Hmm, it isn't fake - i was able to exploit this bug.
> This software (i mean openemr) i so badly written that i have been able
> to find few other bugs, like:
> """
Argh, you're right. The problematic code is here:
interface/globals.php:
....
// required for normal operation because of recent changes in PHP:
$ps =3D strpos($_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'],"myadmin");
if ($ps =3D=3D=3D false) {
extract($_GET);
extract($_POST);
}
// turn off PHP compatibility warnings
ini_set("session.bug_compat_warn","off");
?>
In other words: Turn off all those pesky security improvements, so that we=
=20
may grasp defeat from the jaws of victory. Obviously the number of people=
=20
that are running with the retarded allow_url_fopen setting on should be=20
low but looking at the quality of this software I don't think finding=20
vulnerabilities that can be exploited in real-life installations should be=
=20
hard.
Tinus=
---1685904357-765901060-1170175960=:2924--