The issue is a lack of input validation. OWASP would be a great learning exercise for the coders on this product. It seems to be assumed that only trust-worthy users will connect only to trust-worthy sites. I could not find any evidence of input validation.

Through the magic of Web Scarab and Paros proxy, one can capture the Internet communications used by the F90 Internet Connection Kit software. What you soon see is that the software does not account for either bypassing the local application and changing the input or in spoofed and re-directed sites..

The software does not validate the site it gets the information from nor does it sufficiently validate the input to the software.

At the moment as I think there are so few people as crazy as I am who actually have to have a gadget just as it is Internet connected; this is not likely to become a widespread attack vector.

The software is an oversized web proxy with other stuff to connect to the coffee machine thrown in. Jura did not make the assumption that an evil attacker could purposefully modify and publish "evil" coffee "recipes.

I have been taking the updated SANS@Home 610 course. I have a GREM, but Lenny and the other guys have added an additional component to the Reverse Engineering Malware Course. So I had to take it.

The course focuses on analysing and reversing malware, but IDA and Olly work on binaries of all types and the bad combination of a bottle of good resiling and 9 coffees after midnight is not a good combination. Hence I decided to attack my coffee maker and the control software.

There are certain aspects of code (like the ever faithful GETS() function) that should be beaten from existence. Others need to be securely configuredsuch that all the required variable fields are entered correctly (see SPRINTF()). Unfortunately the coders at Jura did not consider that "bad people"would ever attack a coffee maker .

There are 2 main attacks that I have noted,
1 Loading a malicious setting or recipe into the device causing a "coffee overflow" etc.
2 More seriously, not validating the input correctly coupled with a lack of authorisation of the source and nothing to stop invalid data at the host means that malformed strings can be fed to the software that can either crash the system or if crafted correctly run a binary on the host.

So, as most people who check this list I no doubt know, not validating input is bad. Trusting the web as you have a piece of custom software that is closed source and a belief that users are all nice is bad.

Regards,
Craig Wright GSE-Compliance

PS for DMCA compliance reasons I would state that I was not reversing the software, but rather inputting unusual coffee recipes that had a strange binary flavour

Craig Wright
Manager, Risk Advisory Services

Direct : +61 2 9286 5497
Craig.Wright@bdo.com.au
+61 417 683 914

BDO Kendalls (NSW-VIC) Pty. Ltd.
Level 19, 2 Market Street Sydney NSW 2000
GPO BOX 2551 Sydney NSW 2001
Fax +61 2 9993 9497
http://www.bdo.com.au/

The information in this email and any attachments is confidential. If you are not the named addressee you must not read, print, copy, distribute, or use in any way this transmission or any information it contains. If you havereceived this message in error, please notify the sender by return email, destroy all copies and delete it from your system.

Any views expressed in this message are those of the individual sender and not necessarily endorsed by BDO Kendalls. You may not rely on this message as advice unless subsequently confirmed by fax or letter signed by a Partner or Director of BDO Kendalls. It is your responsibility to scan this communication and any files attached for computer viruses and other defects. BDOKendalls does not accept liability for any loss or damage however caused which may result from this communication or any files attached. A full version of the BDO Kendalls disclaimer, and our Privacy statement, can be found on the BDO Kendalls website at http://www.bdo.com.au/ or by emailing mailto:administrator@bdo.com.au.

BDO Kendalls is a national association of separate partnerships and entities. Liability limited by a scheme approved under Professional Standards Legislation.

Have you shared all of this with the manufacturer first?

t

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Craig Wright [mailto:Craig.Wright@bdo.com.au]
> Sent: Tuesday, June 17, 2008 11:10 PM
> To: security-basics@lists.securityfocus.com; bugtraq@securityfocus.com
> Subject: A more detailed description of the Jura F90 vulnerability.
>
>
> The issue is a lack of input validation. OWASP would be a great
> learning exercise for the coders on this product. It seems to be
> assumed that only trust-worthy users will connect only to trust-worthy
> sites. I could not find any evidence of input validation.
>
> Through the magic of Web Scarab and Paros proxy, one can capture the
> Internet communications used by the F90 Internet Connection Kit
> software. What you soon see is that the software does not account for
> either bypassing the local application and changing the input or in
> spoofed and re-directed sites.
>
> The software does not validate the site it gets the information from
> nor does it sufficiently validate the input to the software.
>
> At the moment as I think there are so few people as crazy as I am who
> actually have to have a gadget just as it is Internet connected; this
> is not likely to become a widespread attack vector.
>
> The software is an oversized web proxy with other stuff to connect to
> the coffee machine thrown in. Jura did not make the assumption that an
> evil attacker could purposefully modify and publish "evil" coffee
> "recipes.
>
> I have been taking the updated SANS@Home 610 course. I have a GREM,
but
> Lenny and the other guys have added an additional component to the
> Reverse Engineering Malware Course. So I had to take it.
>
> The course focuses on analysing and reversing malware, but IDA and
Olly
> work on binaries of all types and the bad combination of a bottle of
> good resiling and 9 coffees after midnight is not a good combination.
> Hence I decided to attack my coffee maker and the control software.
>
> There are certain aspects of code (like the ever faithful GETS()
> function) that should be beaten from existence. Others need to be
> securely configured such that all the required variable fields are
> entered correctly (see SPRINTF()). Unfortunately the coders at Jura
did
> not consider that "bad people" would ever attack a coffee maker .
>
> There are 2 main attacks that I have noted,
> 1 Loading a malicious setting or recipe into the device causing
a
> "coffee overflow" etc.
> 2 More seriously, not validating the input correctly coupled
with
> a lack of authorisation of the source and nothing to stop invalid data
> at the host means that malformed strings can be fed to the software
> that can either crash the system or if crafted correctly run a binary
> on the host.
>
> So, as most people who check this list I no doubt know, not validating
> input is bad. Trusting the web as you have a piece of custom software
> that is closed source and a belief that users are all nice is bad.
>
> Regards,
> Craig Wright GSE-Compliance
>
> PS for DMCA compliance reasons I would state that I was not reversing
> the software, but rather inputting unusual coffee recipes that had a
> strange binary flavour
>
> Craig Wright
> Manager, Risk Advisory Services
>
> Direct : +61 2 9286 5497
> Craig.Wright@bdo.com.au
> +61 417 683 914
>
> BDO Kendalls (NSW-VIC) Pty. Ltd.
> Level 19, 2 Market Street Sydney NSW 2000
> GPO BOX 2551 Sydney NSW 2001
> Fax +61 2 9993 9497
> http://www.bdo.com.au/
>
> The information in this email and any attachments is confidential. If
> you are not the named addressee you must not read, print, copy,
> distribute, or use in any way this transmission or any information it
> contains. If you have received this message in error, please notify
the
> sender by return email, destroy all copies and delete it from your
> system.
>
> Any views expressed in this message are those of the individual sender
> and not necessarily endorsed by BDO Kendalls. You may not rely on this
> message as advice unless subsequently confirmed by fax or letter
signed
> by a Partner or Director of BDO Kendalls. It is your responsibility to
> scan this communication and any files attached for computer viruses
and
> other defects. BDO Kendalls does not accept liability for any loss or
> damage however caused which may result from this communication or any
> files attached. A full version of the BDO Kendalls disclaimer, and our
> Privacy statement, can be found on the BDO Kendalls website at
> http://www.bdo.com.au/ or by emailing mailto:administrator@bdo.com.au.
>
> BDO Kendalls is a national association of separate partnerships and
> entities. Liability limited by a scheme approved under Professional
> Standards Legislation.
>

So you've published what some would call 0day information on a "remotely
exploitable" vulnerability that allows one to compromise another's
workstation using the "I tried" justification? That seems hardly
appropriate for a man of your stature, Craig. Even if the actual risk
of exploitation is very low due to other mitigating factors, responsible
disclosure policies should be respected. But you did manage to get some
nice press in CNET, huh?

By the way, I'm sure you actually executed code as POC rather than just
assuming that you could based on the calls you identified by reverse
engineering the binaries, right? I guess I'm also curious how you are
classifying this as "remotely exploitable" when what you describe in
your "detailed description" sounds more like you would have to get a
victim to go to your evil web site first or download your coffee
"recipe" somehow and feed them to the coffee maker, right? Or is the
maker actually listening for connections and the assumption is that
people will connect it directly to the internet and not behind some NAT
device? Given your apparent full-disclosure policy, you won't mind
sharing POC code with us, right? (even though most people don't have
your kind of money to buy a $2000 coffee machine to test it on . I
think given all the attention you've received about this that the most
complete and accurate information should be made available to the
public.

t

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Craig Wright [mailto:Craig.Wright@bdo.com.au]
> Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 2:43 PM
> To: Thor (Hammer of God); security-basics@lists.securityfocus.com;
> bugtraq@securityfocus.com
> Subject: RE: A more detailed description of the Jura F90
vulnerability.
>
>
> I have attempted to. They are not the easiest company to contact. I am
> sending more details to the firm that tests their products. They seem
> to be a shell with a large number of outsourced arrangements.
>
> Craig
>
>
> Craig Wright
> Manager, Risk Advisory Services
>
> Direct : +61 2 9286 5497
> Craig.Wright@bdo.com.au
> +61 417 683 914
>
> BDO Kendalls (NSW-VIC) Pty. Ltd.
> Level 19, 2 Market Street Sydney NSW 2000
> GPO BOX 2551 Sydney NSW 2001
> Fax +61 2 9993 9497
> http://www.bdo.com.au/
>
> The information in this email and any attachments is confidential. If
> you are not the named addressee you must not read, print, copy,
> distribute, or use in any way this transmission or any information it
> contains. If you have received this message in error, please notify
the
> sender by return email, destroy all copies and delete it from your
> system.
>
> Any views expressed in this message are those of the individual sender
> and not necessarily endorsed by BDO Kendalls. You may not rely on this
> message as advice unless subsequently confirmed by fax or letter
signed
> by a Partner or Director of BDO Kendalls. It is your responsibility to
> scan this communication and any files attached for computer viruses
and
> other defects. BDO Kendalls does not accept liability for any loss or
> damage however caused which may result from this communication or any
> files attached. A full version of the BDO Kendalls disclaimer, and our
> Privacy statement, can be found on the BDO Kendalls website at
> http://www.bdo.com.au/ or by emailing mailto:administrator@bdo.com.au.
>
> BDO Kendalls is a national association of separate partnerships and
> entities. Liability limited by a scheme approved under Professional
> Standards Legislation.
> -----Original Message-----
>
> From: Thor (Hammer of God) [mailto:thor@hammerofgod.com]
> Sent: Thursday, 19 June 2008 3:11 AM
> To: security-basics@lists.securityfocus.com; bugtraq@securityfocus.com
> Subject: RE: A more detailed description of the Jura F90
vulnerability.
>
> Have you shared all of this with the manufacturer first?
>
> t
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Craig Wright [mailto:Craig.Wright@bdo.com.au]
> > Sent: Tuesday, June 17, 2008 11:10 PM
> > To: security-basics@lists.securityfocus.com;
> bugtraq@securityfocus.com
> > Subject: A more detailed description of the Jura F90 vulnerability.
> >
> >
> > The issue is a lack of input validation. OWASP would be a great
> > learning exercise for the coders on this product. It seems to be
> > assumed that only trust-worthy users will connect only to trust-
> worthy
> > sites. I could not find any evidence of input validation.
> >
> > Through the magic of Web Scarab and Paros proxy, one can capture the
> > Internet communications used by the F90 Internet Connection Kit
> > software. What you soon see is that the software does not account
for
> > either bypassing the local application and changing the input or in
> > spoofed and re-directed sites.
> >
> > The software does not validate the site it gets the information from
> > nor does it sufficiently validate the input to the software.
> >
> > At the moment as I think there are so few people as crazy as I am
who
> > actually have to have a gadget just as it is Internet connected;
this
> > is not likely to become a widespread attack vector.
> >
> > The software is an oversized web proxy with other stuff to connect
to
> > the coffee machine thrown in. Jura did not make the assumption that
> an
> > evil attacker could purposefully modify and publish "evil" coffee
> > "recipes.
> >
> > I have been taking the updated SANS@Home 610 course. I have a GREM,
> but
> > Lenny and the other guys have added an additional component to the
> > Reverse Engineering Malware Course. So I had to take it.
> >
> > The course focuses on analysing and reversing malware, but IDA and
> Olly
> > work on binaries of all types and the bad combination of a bottle of
> > good resiling and 9 coffees after midnight is not a good
combination.
> > Hence I decided to attack my coffee maker and the control software.
> >
> > There are certain aspects of code (like the ever faithful GETS()
> > function) that should be beaten from existence. Others need to be
> > securely configured such that all the required variable fields are
> > entered correctly (see SPRINTF()). Unfortunately the coders at Jura
> did
> > not consider that "bad people" would ever attack a coffee maker .
> >
> > There are 2 main attacks that I have noted,
> > 1 Loading a malicious setting or recipe into the device
causing
> a
> > "coffee overflow" etc.
> > 2 More seriously, not validating the input correctly coupled
> with
> > a lack of authorisation of the source and nothing to stop invalid
> data
> > at the host means that malformed strings can be fed to the software
> > that can either crash the system or if crafted correctly run a
binary
> > on the host.
> >
> > So, as most people who check this list I no doubt know, not
> validating
> > input is bad. Trusting the web as you have a piece of custom
software
> > that is closed source and a belief that users are all nice is bad.
> >
> > Regards,
> > Craig Wright GSE-Compliance
> >
> > PS for DMCA compliance reasons I would state that I was not
reversing
> > the software, but rather inputting unusual coffee recipes that had a
> > strange binary flavour
> >
> > Craig Wright
> > Manager, Risk Advisory Services
> >
> > Direct : +61 2 9286 5497
> > Craig.Wright@bdo.com.au
> > +61 417 683 914
> >
> > BDO Kendalls (NSW-VIC) Pty. Ltd.
> > Level 19, 2 Market Street Sydney NSW 2000
> > GPO BOX 2551 Sydney NSW 2001
> > Fax +61 2 9993 9497
> > http://www.bdo.com.au/
> >
> > The information in this email and any attachments is confidential.
If
> > you are not the named addressee you must not read, print, copy,
> > distribute, or use in any way this transmission or any information
it
> > contains. If you have received this message in error, please notify
> the
> > sender by return email, destroy all copies and delete it from your
> > system.
> >
> > Any views expressed in this message are those of the individual
> sender
> > and not necessarily endorsed by BDO Kendalls. You may not rely on
> this
> > message as advice unless subsequently confirmed by fax or letter
> signed
> > by a Partner or Director of BDO Kendalls. It is your responsibility
> to
> > scan this communication and any files attached for computer viruses
> and
> > other defects. BDO Kendalls does not accept liability for any loss
or
> > damage however caused which may result from this communication or
any
> > files attached. A full version of the BDO Kendalls disclaimer, and
> our
> > Privacy statement, can be found on the BDO Kendalls website at
> > http://www.bdo.com.au/ or by emailing
> mailto:administrator@bdo.com.au.
> >
> > BDO Kendalls is a national association of separate partnerships and
> > entities. Liability limited by a scheme approved under Professional
> > Standards Legislation.
> >
>

I have attempted to. They are not the easiest company to contact. I am sending more details to the firm that tests their products. They seem to be a shell with a large number of outsourced arrangements.

Craig


Craig Wright
Manager, Risk Advisory Services

Direct : +61 2 9286 5497
Craig.Wright@bdo.com.au
+61 417 683 914

BDO Kendalls (NSW-VIC) Pty. Ltd.
Level 19, 2 Market Street Sydney NSW 2000
GPO BOX 2551 Sydney NSW 2001
Fax +61 2 9993 9497
http://www.bdo.com.au/

The information in this email and any attachments is confidential. If you are not the named addressee you must not read, print, copy, distribute, or use in any way this transmission or any information it contains. If you havereceived this message in error, please notify the sender by return email, destroy all copies and delete it from your system.

Any views expressed in this message are those of the individual sender and not necessarily endorsed by BDO Kendalls. You may not rely on this message as advice unless subsequently confirmed by fax or letter signed by a Partner or Director of BDO Kendalls. It is your responsibility to scan this communication and any files attached for computer viruses and other defects. BDOKendalls does not accept liability for any loss or damage however caused which may result from this communication or any files attached. A full version of the BDO Kendalls disclaimer, and our Privacy statement, can be found on the BDO Kendalls website at http://www.bdo.com.au/ or by emailing mailto:administrator@bdo.com.au.

BDO Kendalls is a national association of separate partnerships and entities. Liability limited by a scheme approved under Professional Standards Legislation.
-----Original Message-----

From: Thor (Hammer of God) [mailto:thor@hammerofgod.com]
Sent: Thursday, 19 June 2008 3:11 AM
To: security-basics@lists.securityfocus.com; bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Subject: RE: A more detailed description of the Jura F90 vulnerability.

Have you shared all of this with the manufacturer first?

t

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Craig Wright [mailto:Craig.Wright@bdo.com.au]
> Sent: Tuesday, June 17, 2008 11:10 PM
> To: security-basics@lists.securityfocus.com; bugtraq@securityfocus.com
> Subject: A more detailed description of the Jura F90 vulnerability.
>
>
> The issue is a lack of input validation. OWASP would be a great
> learning exercise for the coders on this product. It seems to be
> assumed that only trust-worthy users will connect only to trust-worthy
> sites. I could not find any evidence of input validation.
>
> Through the magic of Web Scarab and Paros proxy, one can capture the
> Internet communications used by the F90 Internet Connection Kit
> software. What you soon see is that the software does not account for
> either bypassing the local application and changing the input or in
> spoofed and re-directed sites.
>
> The software does not validate the site it gets the information from
> nor does it sufficiently validate the input to the software.
>
> At the moment as I think there are so few people as crazy as I am who
> actually have to have a gadget just as it is Internet connected; this
> is not likely to become a widespread attack vector.
>
> The software is an oversized web proxy with other stuff to connect to
> the coffee machine thrown in. Jura did not make the assumption that an
> evil attacker could purposefully modify and publish "evil" coffee
> "recipes.
>
> I have been taking the updated SANS@Home 610 course. I have a GREM,
but
> Lenny and the other guys have added an additional component to the
> Reverse Engineering Malware Course. So I had to take it.
>
> The course focuses on analysing and reversing malware, but IDA and
Olly
> work on binaries of all types and the bad combination of a bottle of
> good resiling and 9 coffees after midnight is not a good combination.
> Hence I decided to attack my coffee maker and the control software.
>
> There are certain aspects of code (like the ever faithful GETS()
> function) that should be beaten from existence. Others need to be
> securely configured such that all the required variable fields are
> entered correctly (see SPRINTF()). Unfortunately the coders at Jura
did
> not consider that "bad people" would ever attack a coffee maker .
>
> There are 2 main attacks that I have noted,
> 1 Loading a malicious setting or recipe into the device causing
a
> "coffee overflow" etc.
> 2 More seriously, not validating the input correctly coupled
with
> a lack of authorisation of the source and nothing to stop invalid data
> at the host means that malformed strings can be fed to the software
> that can either crash the system or if crafted correctly run a binary
> on the host.
>
> So, as most people who check this list I no doubt know, not validating
> input is bad. Trusting the web as you have a piece of custom software
> that is closed source and a belief that users are all nice is bad.
>
> Regards,
> Craig Wright GSE-Compliance
>
> PS for DMCA compliance reasons I would state that I was not reversing
> the software, but rather inputting unusual coffee recipes that had a
> strange binary flavour
>
> Craig Wright
> Manager, Risk Advisory Services
>
> Direct : +61 2 9286 5497
> Craig.Wright@bdo.com.au
> +61 417 683 914
>
> BDO Kendalls (NSW-VIC) Pty. Ltd.
> Level 19, 2 Market Street Sydney NSW 2000
> GPO BOX 2551 Sydney NSW 2001
> Fax +61 2 9993 9497
> http://www.bdo.com.au/
>
> The information in this email and any attachments is confidential. If
> you are not the named addressee you must not read, print, copy,
> distribute, or use in any way this transmission or any information it
> contains. If you have received this message in error, please notify
the
> sender by return email, destroy all copies and delete it from your
> system.
>
> Any views expressed in this message are those of the individual sender
> and not necessarily endorsed by BDO Kendalls. You may not rely on this
> message as advice unless subsequently confirmed by fax or letter
signed
> by a Partner or Director of BDO Kendalls. It is your responsibility to
> scan this communication and any files attached for computer viruses
and
> other defects. BDO Kendalls does not accept liability for any loss or
> damage however caused which may result from this communication or any
> files attached. A full version of the BDO Kendalls disclaimer, and our
> Privacy statement, can be found on the BDO Kendalls website at
> http://www.bdo.com.au/ or by emailing mailto:administrator@bdo.com.au.
>
> BDO Kendalls is a national association of separate partnerships and
> entities. Liability limited by a scheme approved under Professional
> Standards Legislation.
>